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Article

Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a
Crime
Katharine K. Baker

†

Shouldn’t rape, an act of bodily invasion that can traumatize, endanger, and dehumanize its victims, be punished as
crime? For centuries, lawmakers, philosophers, legal theorists,
and women’s rights advocates have converged upon the criminal law as the appropriate vehicle to reflect society’s opprobrium and inculcate norms against rape. This may be changing. In
response to a broad and comprehensive enforcement effort by
the Department of Education (DOE), many universities are re1
drafting their campus sexual assault policies. DOE has made
clear that it believes that Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
requires schools to “address sexual violence and other forms of
2
sex discrimination.” “[S]exual violence refers to physical sexual
acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is in3
capable of giving consent . . . .” In other words, notwithstand† Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Alex BoniSaenz, Kim Bailey, Mark Rosen, Chris Schmidt, and especially Stephanie
Stern for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Copyright © 2015 by
Katharine K. Baker.
1. On May 1, 2014, the Department of Education (DOE) released the
names of fifty-five colleges and universities that it was investigating for potentially discriminatory practices relating to sexual assault on campus. Jennifer
Steinhauer & David S. Joachim, 55 Colleges Named in Federal Inquiry into
Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A15. That list
has now grown to sixty-four and includes some of the country’s most prestigious universities. Tyler Kingkade, 64 Colleges Are Now Under Investigation for
Their Handling of Sexual Assaults, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 12:59
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/colleges-under-investigation
-sex-assault_n_5543694.html.
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014) (emphasis added), http://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education
-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations.
3. Id.
221
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ing twenty centuries of treating rape as a criminal injury, DOE
has recast rape as a civil wrong—a discriminatory act. This Article argues that by invoking a civil process, DOE is likely to
meet with more success in reducing the amount of nonconsensual sex. Once it does so, the norm of male entitlement that
gives rise to so much criminal conduct may be destabilized
enough to enable the criminal law as reformed to be enforced.
The story of criminal rape law’s undoing begins with the
rape reform movement of the 1970’s and 80’s, which attempted
to have the criminal law take rape more seriously. The individual goals of different state rape reform movements were many
and tactics varied, but one overriding goal, shared by virtually
all reformers, was to expand the amount of criminally proscribed activity. Traditional rape law reflected a social norm
4
that validated men’s entitlement to sex and allowed men to
consistently ignore and override women’s will. By refusing to
criminalize sexual activity coerced without force, and often
perpetrated by men that women knew, the law sanctioned
men’s routine appropriation of sex from women. The goal of
rape reform was to make women’s willingness to have sex, her
consent, the centerpiece of the rape inquiry; men would no
longer feel so entitled to disregard a woman’s will in their at5
tempt to get as much sex as they wanted. It is because that
norm has not shifted sufficiently that DOE must now use a civil
cause of action to combat what had been seen as a criminal
problem.
This Article advances three overlapping but different reasons why the criminal law has not been more successful in
4. A “culture of sexual entitlement” is how an independent commission
recently described the norms that enabled, if not caused, two different sexual
assaults allegedly perpetrated by Boston University’s men’s ice hockey team.
One of these incidents resulted in the accused player pleading guilty to assault
and battery. See Boston University Office of the President, Report of the Men’s
Ice Hockey Task Force, BOS. UNIV. (Aug. 28, 2012) http://www.bu.edu/
president/reports/hockey-task-force. Diana Russell helped explain this sense of
entitlement forty years ago, when she asked one of her subjects about her impressions of what motivated the man who raped her. “I think what was going
on in his head was ‘Me, Graham, horny. You, woman!’” DIANA E. H. RUSSELL,
THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE 93 (1975).
5. Rape scholar Cassia Spohn writes that many rape reformers viewed
the law’s traditional approach to rape as “designed [not] to protect women
from sexual assault, but to preserve male rights to possess and subjugate
women as sexual objects.” Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The
Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 121
(1999).
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changing the social norms with regard to male entitlement to
sex. First, the criminal burden of proof makes norm transformation exceedingly difficult. Making consent the determinative
factor in rape does little good if proving the absence thereof—
beyond a reasonable doubt, no less—is all but impossible. A law
that defines rape as nonconsensual sex may get the theory of
rape right, but it ignores the overwhelming practical difficulty
of proving non-consent to an act for which there are no witnesses, no extrinsic evidence, and often no particular reason to
think that the act was not consensual. This problem applies to
a huge amount of sexual misconduct, whether secured through
force or not. If behavior is not punished criminally because it
cannot be proved, then the public’s understanding of criminal
behavior will not change.
Second, competing constructions of “the rapist” undermined feminist attempts to denormalize male predatory behavior. Shortly after most of the original rape reform measures
were implemented, a new wave of changes to rape law
emerged, much of it generated at the federal level. Tough-onrapists measures enacted in the 1990s reflect an understanding
of rapists as profoundly deviant and distinctly criminal. This
pathological view of rape rejects the feminist insight at the core
of much rape reform, which was that male appropriation of sex
is commonplace and completely understandable given heterosexual scripts and norms of sexual pursuit.
Third, rape reformers failed to appreciate the delicate relationship between rape’s injury, victims’ agency, and the criminal law. In an effort to combat social norms that divested women of sexual agency, rape reform efforts asked all parties—
victim, potential perpetrator, and jurors—to assume women
lack agency; but women often resist being viewed this way.
Moreover, when rape is a crime against the state, enforcement
of it necessarily inhibits a victim’s agency because the enforcement power and decision-making is vested in someone other
than the victim. While this is true of all personal injury crimes,
it is a particular problem with rape law if the essence of the injury is an affront to a victim’s autonomy and agency. Enforcing
the crime thus tends to accentuate rather than alleviate the injury to agency, and women consistently refuse to label their
own experiences as rape, even if the criminal law would seem
to.
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the primary
legal frameworks for understanding rape law over time. It traces the origins of rape as a sometimes civil, sometimes criminal,
wrong—through the patriarchal view of rape as a property
crime, to the feminist (and liberal) remake of rape into an individual criminal injury to autonomy. It then briefly discusses re6
cent rejections of the liberal/feminist position. Parts II–IV explore the three major impediments to effective norm change in
more detail.
Part V, after explaining why the recent proposed revisions
to the Model Penal Code are not likely to overcome the problems previously discussed, demonstrates why DOE’s initiative
to use Title IX to curb sexual assaults on campuses may be
more effective. If the new campus policies are effective in reducing the amount of nonconsensual sex, the norms of male entitlement that rape reformers originally tried to dislodge may be
eroded sufficiently for the criminal law to effectively combat
nonconsensual sex. The key to initially dislodging the norm,
however, will be distancing the university procedures from the
criminal law.
Resistance to the new policies to date has come mostly
from those unwilling to see university procedures as distinct
from the criminal law. Thus, critics either insist that the prob7
lem be addressed in the criminal system, or they insist that
8
universities provide criminal law safeguards for those accused.
But these new policies do not involve charging men on college
campuses with rape. The accused are being charged with perpetrating discriminatory conduct. If found responsible for such
conduct, the men should not be considered rapists. Indeed, be-

6. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).
7. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2014, at SR1 (“[S]exual assault on campus should mean what it means in . . .
courts of law.”); Caroline Kitchens, Overreaching on Campus Rape, NAT’L REV.
(May 13, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/377878/overreaching
-campus-rape-caroline-kitchens (“If President Obama really wants to take
rape seriously, he will take the power away from campus kangaroo courts and
place such criminal investigations where they belong: in the hands of trained
law enforcement.”).
8. Numerous Harvard Law School faculty members signed a petition
criticizing Harvard’s proposed rules, in part because those rules did not provide adequate opportunity to investigate facts and confront witnesses. See
Elizabeth Bartholet, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS.
GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2014, at A11.
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cause most people are still not ready to call most men who secure sex without consent “rapists,” DOE and universities must
be careful not to allow people to conflate what DOE is prohibiting with rape.
DOE’s policies do not necessarily represent a codification of
the feminist theory that all nonconsensual sex is rape. One can
believe that the rape reform movement went “too far” in criminalizing nonconsensual sex and still believe that nonconsensual
sex is wrong, that its prevalence is rooted in male entitlement
to sex, and that male entitlement to sex has a serious, negative,
and discriminatory impact on college women. The goal of DOE’s
policies is to reduce that discriminatory male conduct by dislodging the norms that reproduce it.
I. THE THEORIES OF RAPE
This Part provides a brief history of rape law, with an
emphasis on the relatively recent debate over if and how the
law should implement a standard that protects women’s
autonomy by criminalizing nonconsensual sex.
A. THE TRADITIONAL AND MOSTLY OLD VIEW
The first known prohibition on rape appears in Hammura9
bi’s Code and dates from 1900 B.C. Hebrew law punished rape
of a married woman with death, but rape of an unmarried
woman with a fine of fifty shekels and the rapist had to marry
his victim. Under early Roman law, raptus was a private, not a
public wrong, and involved carrying a woman off by force, with
or without intercourse. “The specific malice of the offense consisted not in the sexual ravishment of the woman, but in steal10
ing her away from her parents, guardian or husband.”
Monetary compensation for rape follows logically when
women are viewed as property because rape causes economic
11
injury to the men who own women. The criminalization of
9. See KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA68 (1996).
10. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, Rape and Marriage in the Medieval Canon Law,
in SEX, LAW, AND MARRIAGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 63 (1993).
11. Consider this report from a Justice of the Peace in England in 1745:
Granted a warrant against John Newman of the tithing of Marston,
yeoman, at the complaint of Jane Biggs, wife of John Biggs of same,
for his assaulting her with intent to have carnal knowledge of her
body. Upon his appearance, the fact was so clearly proved upon him,
upon the oath of the complainant, that I adjudged him to pay unto
TION
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rape under this view makes sense for the same reason that
criminalizing larceny makes sense. The state has a legitimate
interest in making sure property interests are secure and stable. This usually means protecting the status quo. Protection of
that status quo includes protection of the family relationships
12
in which patriarchal control is respected by all.
Thus, under the conservative patriarchal world view, there
is no need to get mired in questions of whether the rapist intended to hurt the woman, or was recklessly indifferent to her
consent, or was just trying to have consensual sex but read her
body language wrong. By having sex with another man’s property, a perpetrator was injuring another man. This system
seems inapposite today not just because it placed such a high
value on women’s chastity, but because it was protecting men
from their women’s defilement.
Discomfort with viewing rape as a property crime emerged
as early as the 12th century. At that time, canonical scholars
13
began to distinguish rape from other property crimes. The law
started placing responsibility on the victim to “cry out in protest” though there was little consensus on how much force was
14
necessary to secure prosecution. As that early debate presaged, once the law rejects the idea of women as property of another, it needs another way of conceptualizing rape and women’s role in it.
B. THE LIBERAL, FEMINIST AND MOSTLY CODIFIED VIEW
1. Theory
In her influential 1975 historical study of rape, Susan
Brownmiller argued that not much changed with regard to rape
John Biggs for damages 5 guineas . . . .
Roy Porter, Rape—Does It Have a Historical Meaning? in RAPE 217 (Sylvana
Tomaselli & Roy Porter eds., 1986).
12. See BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 9, at 48 (“To the conservative, the
rapist sets back not just a particular man’s interest in the exclusive possession
and control of his property, but the interest of society as a whole in having
strong patriarchal marriages and families.”); David Dyzenhaus, John Stuart
Mill and the Harm of Pornography, 102 ETHICS 534, 550 (1992) (“Conservatives think that the use of state coercion is justified when there is a threat to
what they hold to be the core values of a legitimate status quo.”).
13. BRUNDAGE, supra note 10, at 66.
14. Id. at 68–69 (“[I]t is not surprising to find that the medieval canonists—like modern lawyers, one may add—were far from unanimous in defining
just what degree of force must be demonstrated to prove rape.”).
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law between the 13th and 20th centuries. The 12th century
debate about weeping and wailing and hue and cry was a debate about how much force and how much resistance were necessary before the law could classify a man’s sexual aggression
as rape. It was Brownmiller and other feminist writers in the
1970s, writing about the ubiquity of men overriding women’s
will, with force or without it, that spurred the rape reform
16
movement.
The predominant definition of rape at that time—“carnal
knowledge, of a woman, not the man’s wife, forcibly and against
her will”—not only contained vestiges of a patriarchal world in
which women were the property of their husbands (if not their
fathers), it made force and resistance necessary elements of the
17
crime. It was clear, though, that rape was no longer considered a property crime. In a polity in which the individual, not
the family, is the basic unit for governance, rape cannot be a
crime against a family whose property is damaged. It has to be
a crime against an individual who is unlawfully touched. Rape
thus seems to be some form of battery. If it is a battery, though,
there would be no reason for a legal requirement to resist; other
victims of battery do not have to resist unwanted physical
touching in order for the law to view the touching as unlawful.
Reformers offered a different view of rape, arguably one
much more in line with a polity that was increasingly willing to
view women as legitimate, autonomous agents of their own
18
economic, social, and sexual destiny. Rape became a crime involving the nonconsensual touching of a particular part of the
body. What makes rape different from other batteries is the
part of the body that is touched or invaded. Nonconsensual
15. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
30 (1975) (“From the thirteenth to the twentieth century, little changed.”).
16. See Spohn, supra note 5 (giving credit to these feminist chroniclers of
rape for starting the rape reform movement); see also SUSAN GRIFFIN, RAPE:
THE ALL AMERICAN CRIME (1971) (criticizing the patriarchal culture that encourages rape); RUSSELL, supra note 4 (relating rape victims’ stories).
17. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 891–94 (5th ed. 2010).
18. At a theoretical level, the feminist effort to redefine rape was not that
controversial because by making consent, or lack thereof, the defining component of rape, the reformers were reifying a liberal construction of the individual. Women were people whose will mattered. To the extent there was controversy over making women’s will matter, it centered on how the law could tell
what women’s will was. Critics of rape reform argued that women often said
no when they meant yes and that any judicial scrutiny of what was verbally
expressed during sex would inevitably ruin the spontaneity and thrill of sexual experience for both parties. See infra text accompanying notes 100–02.
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sexual activity is an unwanted intrusion onto and into a part of
the body that for physiological or cultural reasons, or both, is
understood as deeply infused with emotion and bonding and
pleasure and privacy. Nonconsensual intercourse or touching of
this part of the body may cause emotional, relational, hedonic,
and dignitary injuries.
What makes rape injurious under this view is the uniqueness of the sexual parts of the body. Nonconsensual interference with one’s arm—perhaps when someone grabs you on a
crowded subway—is not as injurious as rape, because rape involves that part of the body that is special. And, of course, what
makes the definitional issue even more problematic is that consensual touching of that part of the body is commonplace, enjoyable, and fine. So it is not just the touching, and it is not just
the part of the body that is touched. What makes rape rape is
19
that the touching of that part of the body is nonconsensual.
Force and resistance have nothing to do with it. Overriding the
victim’s will that she not be touched in that particular area by
that particular person constitutes the gravamen of rape. It is
that act of disregarding her will that violates women’s sexual
20
autonomy.
2. Rape Reform
This liberal construction of rape law undergirds all of the
1970s and 1980s rape reform efforts. In order to effectuate a
change toward a focus on consent, reformers concentrated on
21
three areas. First, they enacted statutes that criminalized
nonconsensual sex secured without any use of force and eliminated the resistance requirement. The law of aggravated bat22
tery polices force; the law of rape was supposed to police something else. While the resistance requirement had often helped
the state prove force (because perpetrators used force to overcome victim resistance), there was no justifiable reason to re19. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 388 (1992) (“[A]ll that
distinguishes [rape] from ordinary sexual intercourse is lack of consent . . . .”).
20. For a comprehensive account of rape as a violation of women’s sexual
autonomy, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998) (concluding chapter entitled
“Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously”).
21. Spohn, supra note 5, at 122 (reformers concentrated on three areas:
eliminating force, enacting rape shield laws, and introducing gradations of
sexual offenses).
22. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860.
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quire women to physically resist an illegal act. One is not required to resist assault or robbery or any other battery. Most
state statutes and state Supreme Courts now articulate at least
some definitions of rape or sexual assault that do not include
23
force. Thus, technically, it is a crime in most states to knowingly disregard a woman’s will when securing sex.
Second, and relatedly, reformers offered gradations of sexual assault. With the encouragement of prosecutors, who knew
that nonviolent sexual attacks would be viewed with some
skepticism, the vast majority of states have adopted a variety of
sexually aggressive offenses: rape, aggravated rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, etc. It is not just traditional carnal
knowledge secured by force, but a variety of potentially offensive sexual contact, secured with or without force, that is crim24
inalized.
Third, reformers enacted evidentiary shield laws that
25
barred evidence of women’s prior sexual behavior. This was
necessary in order to focus the trial on what actually happened
during the event in question, not on whether a woman might
have consented before.
These changes attempted to recognize (i) the legitimacy of
an alleged victim’s voice—force and physical resistance should
not be necessary if the victim expressed her desire not to proceed—and (ii) respect for women’s decision-making capacity—
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No.1 2014) [hereinafter ALI Draft] (explaining that only twelve states maintain the traditional force requirement). But see John F. Decker & Peter G.
Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform
Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1084–86 (2012) (indicating that twenty-eight states allow the
prosecution to convict by showing the victim did not consent; nine states appear to allow for conviction with only nonconsent, but to establish lack of consent, the prosecution must prove force or inability to consent; sixteen states do
not have non-consent offenses—though fifteen of these sixteen allow “incapacity to consent” to substitute for force).
24. Professor Patricia Falk lists seven different “nonviolent” categories of
behavior that are often criminalized: (i) abuse of trust; (ii) abuse of authority;
(iii) nonconsensual sex without force; (iv) sex accomplished through coercion or
extortion; (v) sex with a drunk or drugged victim who is not capable of knowingly consenting; (vi) sex with a mentally incapacitated person who is not capable of knowingly consenting; and (vii) sex secured through fraud. See Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real
World in Thinking About the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE
353, 357–58 (2013).
25. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (prohibiting admission of evidence offered
as proof of a victim’s sexual predisposition or prior sexual history).
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that a woman had consented to sex before did not mean she
26
consented this time. Still, it did not take long for commentators to recognize that many of the most common ways for men
to routinely extract sex from women not only did not involve
force, they did not even involve obvious rejection of a woman’s
voice. Sexual scripts and norms with regard to sexual activity
27
dictated that men were active and women were passive.
Women were supposed to say no when they meant yes or to not
28
say anything at all. Men were supposed to—or at least allowed to—proceed in the face of ambiguity because ambiguity is
what made sex exciting.
Given the strength of those scripts and norms, it was not
surprising to see studies showing that men often confused
29
women’s abject fear for passive acquiescence. One widelyrespected comprehensive study found that 22% of women reported having been forced to do something sexual by a man
while only 3% of men reported having forced a woman to do
30
something sexual. Men tend to interpret women’s nonverbal
actions as indicia of desire to consent, when women do not

26. That these changes were necessary at all shows the unique position of
rape in the criminal law and our culture. Embedded in the traditional approach to rape was a deep distrust of women—a distrust reflected in the formal definition, which required force, and a distrust that manifested itself in
relatively commonplace jury acquittals. It was not the “law” but juries who
had previously concluded that a woman who had consented once, must have
consented again or was disreputable enough that the jury simply did not care
whether she consented. Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 586–88 (1997) (arguing that it was jury disregard for women who seemed “loose” as much as jury disbelief that led juries to acquit in cases with victims who had a sexual
past).
27. Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role Socialization to Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN
CRIME 75 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) (“From their socialization in childhood and adolescence, [men and women] develop[] different
goals related to sexuality . . . . [M]en are supposed to singlemindedly go after
sexual intercourse with a female, regardless of how they do it. . . . [W]omen
should passively acquiesce or use any strategy to try to avoid sexual intercourse.”).
28. Id. at 75–76.
29. See, e.g., Eugene J. Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 97 (1984) (noting that some perpetrators in the study
had mistaken their victims’ fear for acquiescence).
30. ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY
221–28 (1994) (suggesting that there is a “gender chasm” when it comes to
perceptions on whether sex was forced).
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mean for those actions to be interpreted even as sexual inter31
est, much less consent.
Accordingly, many feminist writers encouraged courts to
move toward an affirmative consent standard, what a co-author
32
and I have labeled “a baseline of no,” and others have called
33
the “Yes Model.” Not only should no mean no, silence should
mean no. Unless she says yes, the answer should be no. Several
states adopted statutes that seemed to require affirmative as34
sent to sex. California recently adopted an affirmative consent
standard to be applied at all colleges and universities receiving
35
state funding. Other states have simply proved more willing
36
to convict men who proceed in the face of ambiguity. Some
states have also adjusted the mens rea for rape so that negligence in determining whether a woman consented is sufficient
37
to secure a rape conviction. The proposed revisions to the
Model Penal Code, discussed in Part V.A. below, explicitly
38
adopt an affirmative consent requirement.
Notwithstanding these changes, the number of rape re39
ports that lead to arrest has declined significantly since 1970.

31. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1417
(2005) (citing studies).
32. Katharine K. Baker & Michelle Oberman, Women’s Sexual Agency and
the Law of Rape in the 21st Century, STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 3) (on file with author).
33. Anderson, supra note 31, at 1405.
34. Six states define consent as positive cooperation. ALI Draft, supra
note 23, at 41. In Wisconsin, the crime is defined as sexual intercourse with a
person without the consent of that person, with consent being defined as
“words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent
indicating a freely given agreement . . . .” WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (4) (2013).
Florida defines rape as sex without “intelligent, knowing and voluntary consent . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(a) (2014). In Washington, consent is defined
to mean “that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact
there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have
sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (2008).
35. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a) (West 2015). California did not adopt
an affirmative consent standard into its criminal code generally.
36. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 479 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 962 (Mass. 2001); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609
A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1992).
37. Stephen Schulhofer, Rape-Law Reform Circa 2002: Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far?, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 276, 282 (2003).
38. See infra Part V.A.
39. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals 43 (Feb. 2, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2337621.
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Conviction rates have not increased. The Department of Justice reports that 20% of women on college campuses have been
41
victims of sexual assault, but very few of them bring charges.
Despite all the reform, the criminal law does not appear to be
actively punishing vast amounts of nonconsensual sex.
C. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF FORCE
Recently, in a much critiqued article, Professor Jed
Rubenfeld rejected the feminist/liberal construction of rape’s in42
jury. Using the law’s reticence to treat sex secured by decep43
tion as rape, Rubenfeld argues that it cannot be overriding the
victim’s will with regard to how the sexual parts of her body are
touched that constitutes the gravamen of rape. If the law really
saw that as injury, it would punish sex secured by deception
44
because everywhere else in the law, fraud vitiates consent. Instead, Rubenfeld argues, the injury of rape results from a combination of force and sex that takes away the victim’s selfcontrol. Sex that is secured through force violates a victim’s
45
right to “self-possession,” as do slavery and torture. Sex se40. Id. at 43–44; see Spohn, supra note 5, at 129.
41. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE
SERV. THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY: FINAL REPORT XIII (Oct. 2007),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/grants/221153.pdf. This figure is controversial,
but it is “not out of line with what is reported by other studies.” See Marc Perry, Behind the Statistics on Campus Rape: Research Is More Nuanced than
Easy Numbers Imply, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 9, 2015), http://chronicle
.com/article/Behind-the-Statistics-on/151089 (quoting rape researcher Mary P.
Koss).
42. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6. Yale Law Journal Online published a forum after Rubenfeld’s article came out, in which Professors Tom Dougherty,
Patricia Falk, Gowri Ramachandran, and Deborah Tuerkheimer all took issue
with Rubenfeld’s insistence on force. See YALE L.J., http://www.yalelawjournal
.org/forum/ (follow “volume 123” hyperlink; then scroll down to collection of
articles responding to Jed Rubenfeld) (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); see also Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, A Quite Principled Conceit, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 83 (2013)
(arguing that all criminal statutes involve imperfect line-drawing and
Rubenfeld’s line, which he draws with the concept of self-possession, is no better at capturing our intuitions than is the line drawn by invoking the concept
of sexual autonomy); Sherry Colb, The Role of Consent in Defining Rape, DORF
ON LAW (May 1, 2013), http://www .dorfonlaw.org/2013/05/the-role-of-consent
-in-definingrape.html (saying no should be enough, because once someone has
said no and the other person does not stop, there is an implicit threat in place);
Yung, supra note 39.
43. Rape-by-deception usually involves a man impersonating another man
or claiming to be someone that he is not. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1375–
76.
44. Id. at 1376.
45. Id. at 1434.
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cured without force does not result in a comparable injury. For
46
Rubenfeld, rape is forcible rape. Everything else—sex with an
intoxicated person, sex with an unconscious or underage person, sex with someone who just lies there—if it should be crim47
inalized at all, is something other than rape.
By (re)making force an essential part of rape, Rubenfeld
solves two of the biggest practical problems to confront criminal
enforcement of contemporary rape law. First, force is exceedingly useful in establishing lack of consent. Just as the resistance requirement helped establish force, so the force requirement helped establish lack of consent. In the absence of
48
writings or witnesses or videotape, jurors have very little way
49
of determining that someone did not consent to an act. Force
makes that clear. Second, force helps establish that the alleged
rapist knew that the victim was not consenting. In a context in
which ambiguity and wordlessness are celebrated as passion, a
potential defendant can have a very difficult time discerning
consent. But he almost certainly knows whether he used force.

46. This is an obvious, if implicit rejection of Professor Susan Estrich’s argument of 30 years ago. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 5–7 (1987) (arguing
that “simple rape” by a man who does not expressly use or threaten force with
a woman whom he knows is “real rape”). Professor Rubenfeld’s position also
aligns him with a hapless bunch of Tea Party candidates who ran into trouble
trying to explain what they thought “real rape” was. See Gowri
Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 371, 372 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/12/1/
ramachandran.html.
47. Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1435–42 (discussing why sex with unconscious, drunk, and underage “partners” should not be considered rape).
Rubenfeld appears sometimes to argue that these acts should be treated as
batteries, id. at 1440 (“[S]exual penetration of an unconscious stranger (or
mere acquaintance) . . . is a crime under traditional assault-and-battery law.”),
but at other times suggest that criminal prohibitions on this sort of activity
are inevitably too broad. See infra note 50.
48. The existence of videotape can even fail to establish the consent question definitively. See infra text accompanying notes 82–87.
49. Lack of consent is difficult whether the law uses a subjective or objective standard. If courts interpret the question of consent to be only about the
alleged victim’s state of mind, whatever her outward manifestations, it is particularly difficult to prove. But even if courts instruct juries, or juries believe,
that lack of consent must be established objectively, such that it is clear that
consent was absent or ambiguous, establishing those facts beyond a reasonable doubt is very difficult. See Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 284–85 (discussing
the objective and subjective standards and noting that neither party is likely
telling the complete truth); infra Part II (discussing the difficulties in securing
a sexual assault conviction).
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Rubenfeld does not ground his conceptualization of rape
50
law in arguments about enforceability or culpability, though.
51
He grounds his argument in the nature of the injury. Applying
his theory to the problem of sexual assault on college campuses,
he argues that attempts like DOE’s to enforce broader understandings of assault using lesser standards of proof will exacerbate what he sees as the fundamental problem: “that almost no
college rapists are criminally punished,” because victims go
52
through a college process, not the criminal law. He suggests
that the college process should be integrated with law enforcement, not distinct from it, so that those who actually commit
rape (that is, in Rubenfeld’s view, those who use force) will be
criminally punished.
The analysis that follows explains why Professor Rubenfeld
and other DOE critics’ faith in the criminal process to adjudi50. His argument against criminalizing some forms of nonconsensual sex
may be grounded in culpability. He argues that attempts to prohibit nonforceful nonconsensual sex are so overbroad that they criminalize behavior
that is commonplace, like drunk people having sex or touching another’s sexual organs while sleeping. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1442 (discussing sexual contact involving intoxication); id. at 1440 (discussing sexual contact during sleep).
51. Most of the criticism of Rubenfeld has come from those who cannot
accept his argument that the harm from unconsented to sex is insufficiently
grave to warrant punishment as a rapist. Critics argue that the harm from
coerced sex in which no force was used can be just as devastating as the harm
from a typical forced rape. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 42, at 82 (arguing that in the end Rubenfeld’s framework relies on intuitions about what
should be criminalized (sex by deception should not), but to get there
Rubenfeld excludes other acts that many people’s intuitions suggest should be
considered rape, i.e., when the victim is unconscious, asleep, or very intoxicated); Falk, supra note 24, at 360–62 (detailing the many instances in which behavior that Rubenfeld would not term rape harms victims). Others argue that
knotty questions of consent cannot be avoided under Rubenfeld’s definition,
because even if we frame the issue in terms of self-possession, there is the
question of whether one consented to the loss of possession. Tom
Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-byDeception,” 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 321, 325–26 (2013), http://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/no-way-around-consent-a-reply-to-rubenfeld-on-rape-by
-deception. Moreover, it is arguably not rape but sex itself that leads one to
lose a sense of being self-possessed. This may be particularly true for women,
for whom a great deal of consensual sexual activity inevitably involves an invasion of the self. Women are quite used to “no longer [being] their own person,” see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1430, whether during sex or during pregnancy. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35
(1988) (suggesting that for most women, in pregnancy and in intercourse, the
sense of being invaded, possessed by another, is commonplace—for men, it is
very rare).
52. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6.

2015]

NOT A CRIME?

235

cate and punish sexual assault is misplaced. But the mere
presence of Rubenfeld’s article, and the uproar around it, indicate that rape reformers were not as successful as hoped in
changing norms with regard to what is criminal behavior. The
law changed, but many people, including prominent criminal
law scholars, still reject the notion that nonconsensual sex is
rape. It is hardly surprising, then, that a tremendous amount
of nonconsensual sex goes unpunished.
II. THE (ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE) ROAD TO
CONVICTION
The first major impediment for the rape reform movement
had to do with problems of proof. For a while now, commentators have recognized how hard it can be to prove nonconsensual
53
sex between acquaintances. Stranger rape, in which the operative question is not usually whether consensual sexual activity
occurred but who perpetrated an obviously nonconsensual act,
is now exceedingly easy to prove. Thanks to DNA evidence, the54
se cases are virtually never tried anymore. Assuming appropriately followed police procedure, a rape kit tells us with certainty that a particular man’s semen was found in a particular
victim’s body. That man pleads guilty to something because
there is no way he can overcome the scientific proof linking him
to a crime. His only potential defense is consent—but that is
too implausible in the paradigmatic stranger rape scenario.
Once there is a plausible story of consent, though, the problems of proof become paramount. In an age when hook-ups are
55
the norm for college students, when sex on first dates is com53. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1316–17 (1997) (discussing
prosecutorial difficulty in proving non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt); see
also Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 690
(1999) (explaining that the circumstances surrounding date rape often make it
difficult to prove non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt).
54. See Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74–
75 nn.73–75, 75 (2008) (analyzing and citing studies showing that the plea
bargain rate for felony rape convictions is 90%, as compared with a 51% plea
bargain rate for felony murder); see also D. Michael Risnger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786 (2007) (discussing how DNA technology has reduced the prevalence of false identifications, which are likely to be challenged
in court, in rape cases).
55. Between 60–80% of North American college students report having
some hook-up experience. See Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture:
A Review, 16 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 161, 163 (2012).
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mon, and when many people celebrate the liberating opportuni56
ties of sex without relationship, there are many reasons to believe an alleged victim might have consented. Often, alleged
57
rapes start with consensual touching. Sometimes there has
been consensual intercourse before. In a surprising number of
cases there is consensual intercourse afterwards, even if the
58
victim perceived the earlier incident as rape. Sexual activity,
whether coerced or not, usually takes place in private. There is
usually no tangible evidence of non-consent. Everyone concedes
that intercourse took place.
The victim’s story is all the prosecution has. The defendant, if well-represented, does not have to take the stand. Therefore, whether he remembers everything perfectly, whether he
has ever lied before, whether he is the “type” of person who
might have done the opposite of what he claims, does not have
to be at issue. Meanwhile, because the victim usually must
take the stand, her memory, her credibility, and her character
59
are inevitably at issue; she is the only proof.
The circumstances in which rapes occur and the sexual nature of the crime make it likely that she will be a bad witness.
The vast majority of acquaintance rapes involve people who
60
have been drinking alcohol, thus their memories are likely to
56. HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN 25–40 (2012) (arguing that contemporary women are liberated from oppressive relationships when given the
freedom to hook-up); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and
out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 853 (2010) (arguing that sex without intimacy or relationship affords women freedom that has been denied to them in
relationships).
57. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184–85 (Cal. 2003) (describing a case
where a victim initially consented to some sexual contact but then withdrew
consent); R. Lance Shotland, A Theory of Courtship Rape: Part 2, 48 J. SOC.
ISSUES 127, 129 (1992) (describing initially consensual behavior that turns into rape).
58. See Melissa J. Layman et al., Unacknowledged Versus Acknowledged
Rape Victims: Situational Factors and Posttraumatic Stress, 105 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 124, 127 (reporting that 10% of victims who acknowledged being
raped had sex with the perpetrator afterwards; 32% of victims who did not
acknowledge what happened to them as rape had sex with the perpetrator afterwards).
59. Evidence rules allow any witness’ credibility to be impeached. See
FED. R. EVID. 607, 608. If a defendant never testifies, his credibility is not
openly questioned.
60. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 53, at 1350 (citing earlier studies
showing between 75–90% of sexual assaults on college campuses involve alcohol); Meichun Mohler-Kuo et al., Correlates of Rape While Intoxicated in a National Sample of College Women, 65 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 37, 40 (2004) (stating that 72% of college rape victims reported being intoxicated during the
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be fuzzy. Even without alcohol, rape victims “tend to have less
clear and vivid memories than people with other types of trau61
matic or unpleasant experiences.” Indeed, blocking out the
event from one’s memory has been found to be a healthy psychological response. It helps diminish the ongoing trauma that
62
rape victims suffer. In other words, the healthier the victim,
63
the worse she is as a witness.
Even if victims can recall what happened, even if they did
64
not just close their eyes and cry, it can be very difficult to describe what happened. Most people are not used to describing
their sex lives in detail, if at all. To be asked to do so, under
oath, with one’s description subject to vigorous scrutiny not only by defense counsel but by a group of twelve strangers, can be
65
daunting.
There is only so much that rape shield laws can place off66
limits in a trial. No court is going to exclude the victim’s past

rape).
61. Arthur Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral
Science Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 591, 625 (2000).
62. Id.
63. For those familiar with this data, there was a telltale sign that the infamous Rolling Stone article, which was later retracted because the victim’s
story appears to have been highly inaccurate, was wrong. The reporter wrote
that the victim “remember[ed] every moment of the three hours of agony.” Sabrina Rubin Erdely, A Rape on Campus: A Brutal Assault and Struggle for
Justice at UVA, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 19, 2014), http://web.archive.org/web/
20141123012328/http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/a-rape-on
-campus-20141119. Those who work with rape victims know that it is very unlikely that a victim would remember every moment. See Garrison, supra note
61.
64. Professor Estrich described her own rape and how difficult it can be to
recollect the incident for the police when they ask. She reflected that “no one
[tells you] that if you’re raped, you should not shut your eyes and cry for fear
that this really is happening.” ESTRICH, supra note 46, at 2.
65. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She Hadn’t:
Inside One College’s Response When a Student Came Forward, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2014, at 15 (“It was one of the hardest things I have ever gone
through . . . I felt like I was talking to someone who knew nothing [about] any
sort of social interaction; what happens at parties; what happens in sex.”);
Richard Pérez-Peña & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sex Assaults Holds Colleges
to Account, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at 1 (reporting that one Columbia University student commented that when she had to testify about how she was
raped anally, she “had to tell an embarrassing story and then teach [the university panel] an embarrassing subject . . . [which] felt really gross”).
66. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 53, at 1287 (“[S]ome sorts of evidence
about the complainant’s character and habits will inevitably be available to
the jury.”).
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67

sexual behavior with the alleged perpetrator. No court will ex68
clude incidents about which she may have lied in the past. No
court can make it easy for her to talk about her own embarrassment, possible fear, and sense of powerlessness during a
69
sexual encounter. Her comfort with her own sexuality, her experience and familiarity with certain acts and sensations will
be on display whether she wants them to be or not.
Consider the well-publicized recent case of Army Brigadier
General Jeffrey A. Sinclair. General Sinclair had what everyone acknowledged was a three-year affair with a female captain
under his command. The woman’s complaint alleged that during the affair, the general forced her to have oral sex. Her story
was that “[w]ith the relationship becoming increasingly stormy,
General Sinclair one day walked into her office in Afghanistan,
unbuttoned his pants, grabbed her by the neck and forced her
70
to fellate him.” She testified that “I know I didn’t pull away
71
from him, but I didn’t want to do it.” The Army’s case against
the general collapsed.
Even if the woman had no history of lying and no previous
testimony that was subject to impeachment, this would be an
exceedingly difficult case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Indeed, General Sinclair could have been much more violent.
72
He could have started to choke her; he could have pinned her;
he could have pulled her arm across her back and threatened to
break it and then demanded that she perform sexual acts on
him. None of these hypothetical acts would leave proof of rape
73
but no one—not even Professor Rubenfeld —would suggest

67. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B) (providing a specific exception for consensual sex with the accused).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 608.
69. And what if she has felt all of those sensations during consensual sex?
Is it her responsibility to still articulate the difference? If she has difficulty doing so, does that mean she has not been injured? See infra Part IV.A.
70. Alan Blinder & Richard Oppel Jr., How a Military Sexual Assault
Case Foundered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, at A19.
71. Id.
72. Choking and strangulation tend to leave minimal signs of injury and
are risk factors for later violence. Maureen Funk & Julie Schuppel, Strangulation Injuries, 102 WIS. MED. J. 41, 43 (2003); Kathryn Laughon et al., Revision
of the Abuse Assessment Screen to Address Nonlethal Strangulation, 37 J. OBSTETRIC GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 502, 502–05 (2008). The victim
in the Sinclair case also alleged that the accused threatened to kill her if she
told his wife about their affair. See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.
73. See supra Part I.C.
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that they were not rape. Yet the law would likely not have been
able to punish General Sinclair for any of it.
The defense’s attacks on her credibility would be the same
no matter how bad her allegations: she was a jealous lover who
wanted to hurt “the wife”; she wanted to retaliate against him
for ending the relationship; she was accusing him of rape to
protect herself from a charge of adultery (which can be illegal
74
in the military); she had loved him. Like many victims of rape,
75
she had consensual sex with him again. All of that makes her
a bad witness. Unless there was demonstrable evidence of force
or witnesses that heard him threaten, the prosecution had
nothing but her word on which to rely.
The reason this case fell so completely apart was not because it became clear that what she alleged happened did not
happen. What became clear is that the prosecution could not
prove it. The biggest blow to the Army was not a piece of evidence suggesting that her account of the rape was untrue, but
that she had previously lied about the existence of a cell phone
containing (redundant) proof that the affair had been consensual. The cell phone was a smoking gun with regard to the witness’s overall credibility, not a smoking gun with regard to the
facts of what was alleged.
For better or worse, evidence rules allow fact finders to
make overall credibility determinations about witnesses based
76
on what those witnesses have said in the past. The trial judge
sanctioned the Army officials for letting politics blind them to
what any experienced prosecutor should have known—and the
original prosecutor who resigned from the case appears to have
known—that the case could not be won with a witness who had
77
a credibility problem. Victim credibility is all there is in a case
like this.

74. All of these arguments were made by the defense in the Sinclair case.
See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.
75. See Garrison, supra note 61, at 616.
76. See generally FED. R. EVID. 608 (allowing character evidence for truthfulness even though the rules disallow character evidence for other traits).
77. The military judge stopped the court-martial and ordered parties to
work out a settlement indicating that the Army’s decision to prosecute the
General had been motivated too much by politics and not enough by the realities of the case. The original chief prosecutor for the Army resigned from the
case under protest because his superiors continued to press for the most serious charges against his will. Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70, at A1, A19.
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This problem of having to rely so completely on the victim’s
credibility has nothing to do with police or prosecutors not believing in the harms of acquaintance rape. It has nothing to do
with the law trying to push juries to effectuate social change
78
too abruptly. It has little to do with women as a class not being believed. Throughout the General Sinclair saga, the Army
maintained that it believed the woman. The problem is that
rape is a crime that by its nature has no witnesses, produces no
demonstrable evidence, and inevitably brings with it a perfectly
plausible theory of legality, i.e., consent. The crime also involves, indeed the essence of the injury stems from, an act that
most people find very difficult to talk about.
Consider also the case of a Columbia University student
79
profiled in the New York Times. She alleged that a friend,
with whom she had had consensual sex twice, raped her. She
recounted to the university tribunal that one evening she willingly let the accused man accompany her back to her room from
a party but shortly after getting there:
[He] grabbed her wrists and pinned her arms behind her head. He
pushed her legs against her chest and forcefully penetrated her anus.
They had never had anal sex before. They had never discussed it. It
was painful. S[he] began to struggle, screaming at him to stop, yelling
at him to get off of her. He didn’t stop.
Afterwards, he lay next to her for a few seconds. They didn’t
speak. He abruptly got out of bed, gathered his clothes, and walked
80
out the door, leaving a handle of vodka behind him.

This is a perfectly plausible story. There is nothing about
her narrative that suggests that she is lying or misremembering anything—even though she acknowledged that she was,
understandably, nervous and uncomfortable—when reciting
the facts to university officials. The problem is that it is incredibly easy for the alleged perpetrator or his defense team to tell
a comparably plausible story, an almost-comparably-plausible
story, or a story that even if unlikely, might be true. As long as
he, or his defense team, tell any of those competing stories in a
78. Professor Dan Kahan has written about the dangers of trying to
change social norms—particularly entrenched social norms—too quickly. See
Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 623–25 (2000) (suggesting societal norms contributed to the ineffectiveness of rape law reforms).
79. Pérez-Peña & Taylor, supra note 65.
80. Anna Bahr, Accessible, Prompt, and Equitable?: An Examination of
Sexual Assault at Columbia, BLUE & WHITE, Feb. 2014, at 17, http://static1
.squarespace.com/static/545d1072e4b043f3abfccc09/t/549efd16e4b0be677c08d3
a1/1419705622273/February+2014+Issue.pdf.
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remotely credible manner, the criminal burden of proof entitles
81
him to a finding of not guilty.
Even when there is corroborating evidence, proof problems
abound. In 2006, an Illinois high school student accused Adrian
Missbrenner and several other men of rape after she learned
there was a videotape of them having sex with her while she
82
was very intoxicated. In this case, the victim did not have to
take the stand. She let the tape testify for her. The tape showed
three older boys having sex with her and scribbling obscenities
on her body. There was undisputed evidence that the victim
had been drinking, and by the end of the video, she was clearly
unconscious. Prosecutors argued that the tape was proof that
the victim was too intoxicated to consent to intercourse. The jury acquitted Missbrenner.
83
The tape was in three segments. In the first, the girl is
heard making sounds and (possibly) talking while having sex
with the first man. In the second part, the one in which
Missbrenner appears penetrating her, prosecutors argued that
the girl’s eyes were closed and she was listless. In the third
segment, the victim is unconscious. It is in the third segment
84
that the men wrote sexual slurs and spit on her body. To the
jurors, it was unclear how soon after Missbrenner’s intercourse
85
the last segment was taped.
Notably, one juror said, “I think they should still go for the
86
civil trial. There’s a different set of standards there.” “Clearly
we knew what those young men did was wrong. Clearly, they
87
took advantage of her. But there was reasonable doubt.” Rape
jurors take reasonable doubt seriously. After an acquittal in an

81. Universities are not bound to use the criminal burden, see infra Part
V.B.1.b, but the Columbia tribunal still found the evidence of assault too indeterminate to hold the defendant responsible. See Pérez-Peña & Taylor, supra
note 65, at 1, 22.
82. Burr Ridge Man Acquitted in Rape Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4,
2006.
83. No one except the prosecutors, the defense, the judge, and the jurors
saw the videotape, but it was described sufficiently for reporters to learn about
the segments and what was in them. See Christy Gutowski, Juror Says Case
“Insult Not Assault” Tape Shows Naperville Girl Was a “Willing Participant,”
Woman Says, CHIC. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 18, 2005.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. John Bisognano, Juror: Tape Key to Verdict; Foreman in Rape Case
Says There Was Doubt, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 2006, at 2C.1.
87. Id.
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Army sexual misconduct trial several years before the
Missbrenner case, a juror explained, “it’s not that we didn’t be88
lieve the women; it’s that we had reasonable doubt.”
89
A California judge who tried California v. John Z., a text90
book case of complicated consent, voiced comparable concerns.
John Z. is notable for the California Supreme Court’s willingness to affirm the trial court’s finding of rape even though the
victim testified that she said yes before she said no. The case
was tried by a judge without a jury, and the judge made a finding of force, presumably because the defendant pushed the girl
91
onto the bed. In a subsequent interview, the judge opined that
a jury probably would not have found the defendant guilty as
he did, and he was not sure that he himself would convict again
92
on identical facts. The prosecution’s appellate lawyer assigned
93
to defend the verdict on appeal expressed comparable doubts.
Several experienced sex crimes prosecutors, when asked their
opinion about this case, expressed shock that the prosecution
94
had gone forward. They thought it was too hard to win.

88. All Things Considered: McKinney Juror Speaks, NPR (Mar. 19, 1998)
(Interview by Robert Siegel & Noah Adams with Martha Raddatz), http://www
.npr.org/programs/all-thingsconsidered/1998/03/19/12966073/?showDate=1998
-03-19.
89. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). This case is reproduced in many
casebooks also because the woman acknowledged saying yes before she said
no.
90. John Z. involved two boys having sex with a seventeen year-old girl.
The boys had been drinking. The girl had not. It was not videotaped. See
Michelle Oberman, Two Truths and a Lie: In re John Z. and Other Stories at
the Juncture of Teen Sex and the Law, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 364 (2013)
(providing an in-depth description of the case and the lawyers and judges involved in it). John Z. used to be featured in the most popularly used Criminal
Law casebook, the fifth edition of Joshua Dressler’s Cases and Materials on
Criminal Law. Though it was removed in the most recent edition, the authors
continue to contemplate putting it back in and continue to reference the case
and Professor Oberman’s article. E-mail from Joshua Dressler, Distinguished
Univ. Professor, Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, to Katharine Baker,
Professor of Law, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law (June 10, 2015, 1:31 PM) (on file with
author).
91. See Oberman, supra note 90, at 386.
92. See id. at 386–87 (describing an interview with the trial judge).
93. Id. at 389 (“I don’t lose any sleep over ninety-nine percent of [the cases
being prosecuted]. . . . This case is in the one percent of uncertainty for me.”).
94. Id. at 375–76 (describing experienced prosecutors wondering how the
case ever made it through the prosecutor’s screening process with “so many
proof problems”).
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John Z. and the recent convictions in the videotaped case
95
from Steubenville, Ohio, show that occasionally the law can do
what reformers wanted. It can criminalize nonconsensual sex
96
qua nonconsensual sex. But these cases also show how extraordinarily difficult it is to convict. The high school girl on the
97
videotape in Steubenville was unconscious the entire time.
Both cases were tried in juvenile court to a judge, not a jury.
That’s one finder of fact to convince, not twelve. Judges are also
trained to apply the law as written. They should be much less
likely than lay jurors to let preconceived notions of “what rape
is” affect their judgment.
The standard feminist critique of why rape reform has not
resulted in more convictions is that police and prosecutors fail
98
to prosecute the law as written. But police and prosecutors
should not be blamed for failure to prosecute that which they
cannot prove. Indeed, the Army prosecutors in the Sinclair case
were sanctioned for proceeding with a case that they should
99
have known they could not adequately prove.
The feminist defense of rape reform has focused on the
normative propriety of making consent the defining line between rape and sex, but feminists have arguably paid too little
attention to the practical difficulty of making consent the central issue. The problem is not, as the normative debate suggests, that by requiring evidence of consent the law is killing
the spontaneity, ruining the romance, and demanding cold
95. For a description of the case, see Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape
Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at D1. The
incident was also covered extensively on cable news. See, e.g., Erik Wemple,
CNN Is Getting Hammered for Stuebenville Coverage, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2013/03/18/cnn
-is-getting-hammered-for-steubenville-coverage.
96. There was a finding of force in John Z., but it was minimal (pushing
the victim back down on a bed). See Oberman, supra note 90, at 386.
97. Macur & Schweber, supra note 95.
98. See generally ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM
AND THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS 80–100 (2013) (ebook) (finding that police and
prosecutors often do not take rape claims seriously); Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 979, 1010–
11 (1993) (articulating that the police and prosecutors “unfound” cases that
did not fit into the stranger rape paradigm); Morrison Torrey, When Will We
Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24
U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991) (detailing the ways in which police, prosecutors, and jurors refuse to believe women).
99. The court-martial judge reprimanded Army officials for letting the political pressure to enforce sexual assault rules cloud their judgment of whether
this was an appropriate case to press. See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.
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100

hard contracts for sex. Those claims are readily dismissed be101
cause (1) talking about sex does not necessarily ruin it, and
(2) women’s safety is far more important than men’s dreams of
102
romance. The problem is that it does limited good to change
the law to require communication of consent if no one can prove
what is required. It may even be damaging to ask the law to do
something that in the vast majority of appropriate cases, it
cannot do.
103
The result is that cases either are not pursued or they
are pursued but do not result in convictions. What kind of message does the result in the Missbrenner case send to young men
who have the opportunity to take advantage of a not completely
unconscious woman? What kind of message does the collapse of
the Army’s case in Sinclair send to women who might come
forward with allegations of rape by a superior officer? Would
anyone, should anyone, tell the Columbia student to pursue
criminal charges given how extraordinarily unlikely it would be
for the prosecution to be able to secure a conviction? Without
more convictions based on the new understanding of what rape
is, people will not come to understand the underlying behavior
as criminal. The criminal law is not punishing a vast amount of
nonconsensual sex because the law cannot prove that it hap104
pened.
100. See Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103 PUB.
INT. 54, 60 (1991); George F. Will, Sex Amidst the Semicolons, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 4, 1992, at 92.
101. Jason Vest, The School that Put Sex to the Test: At Antioch, a Passionate Reaction to Consent Code, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1993, at G1 (reporting that
sex continues to be a regular part of life at Antioch College despite the mandatory communication-before-sex requirement); see also Jane Gross, Combating
Rape on Campus in a Class on Sexual Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at
A1.
102. See Baker, supra note 53 (“[T]here is a mystery and spontaneity to
non-verbal communication . . . but it can also be very dangerous.”); Lynne
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 162 (1992) (finding
that much of women’s “fear, shame, and anger” at being assaulted could be
“easily avoided” with communication); see also ALI Draft, supra note 23 (assuming consent when there is none or giving a “false positive[]” presents a far
greater danger than assuming no consent or giving a “false negative[]”).
103. Oberman, supra note 90 (explaining that experienced prosecutors
would not have pursued the John Z. case because of victim hardship and the
small chance of success); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 (2001) (discussing prosecutor disincentives for cases that are difficult to prove).
104. People may believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these men are
doing something wrong. Rape reformers can take some comfort in that what
had once been seen as inevitable or justifiable is now seen as unjustifiable.
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III. THE COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE
RAPIST
The second major impediment for the rape reform movement derives from competing constructions of rapists. As suggested earlier, one of the primary goals of rape reform was to
expand the amount of legally-proscribed sexual activity by encouraging the law and those who enforce it to see “sex” that
was coerced, often by an acquaintance, without the use of a
105
weapon or the infliction of other external injury, as “rape.” As
Susan Estrich argued with the title of her book, the goal was to
106
treat all kinds of rape as “Real Rape,” though many people
realized that securing convictions for this new kind of rape
107
would be difficult. The problem stemmed from just how commonplace acquaintance rapist behavior is. Significant numbers
108
of men admit to having committed rape. Even more men admit to having coerced sex, when coercion is defined along a
spectrum of ignoring women’s protests, to using physical
109
force. Studies document that men rape without even realizing
Rape reform may have shifted attitudes away from blaming women toward
acknowledging the fault of the rapist. See Macur & Schweber, supra note 95
(noting that people sympathetic to the football players in Steubenville even
acknowledged that they were not being decent human beings). Compare
Baker, supra note 26, at 587–88 (discussing prominent cases in which jurors
or the public refused to blame the accused men because, although they
acknowledged the accused men used force to secure sex, they thought the
women deserved it), with Chuck Goudie, Outcome of Video Rape Case Is No
Cause for Celebration, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 3, 2006 (articulating that
Missbrenner’s own mother said that what her son did was not “nice”), and
Gutowski, supra note 83 (explaining that jurors saw the behavior as wrong).
But see Oberman, supra note 90, at 399 (explaining that no one whom Professor Oberman spoke to in her in-depth study of the John Z. case defended John
Z.’s actions).
105. See supra Part I.B.
106. ESTRICH, supra note 46.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19.
108. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 21
(1994); see also Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE & SEXUAL
ASSAULT II 3, 11 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988) (finding that one in twelve
men admitted to committing rape). This is a dated study, but given the number of sexual assaults that occur on college campuses today, a reduced finding
would be surprising. E.g., Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New Guidance for Sexual-Assault Violations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-Issues-New/127004
(estimating
that one in five women on college campuses are victims of sexual assault).
109. See Karen R. Rapaport & C. Dale Posey, Sexually Coercive College
Males, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 27, at 217, 219–20.
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110

that they have. Men, understandably, confuse women’s passivity for consent because many men know that women can be
111
passive even when they want to consent to sex. Men believe
112
that women say no when they mean yes. And some women do
113
say no when they mean yes.
In addition, men are expected to treat sex as a given in
their lives, an obvious goal with a prize that enhances their
114
masculinity in their own eyes and the eyes of others. Men are
encouraged to compete with other men with regard to sexual
115
conquests. It is thus all too obvious why men proceed with sex
even if a woman does not expressly consent. Men are not
taught to think of nonconsensual sex as an oxymoron, much
less rape, so it is not surprising that men rape when the defini116
tion of rape is nonconsensual sex.
Rape reformers knew this. They knew that they were trying to dismantle entrenched norms in gendered scripts that all
too easily explained why acquaintance rape was so prevalent.
They knew that they were indicting the status quo and trying
to make it criminal. Professor Catharine MacKinnon opined,
110. Kanin, supra note 29.
111. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 1416 (discussing women’s passivity); see also Baker, supra note 53, at 674 (recounting literature on how women
are socialized to be passive); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural
Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387,
440 (1996) (“Th[e] overriding theme of female silence as the mark of a good
woman expresses itself in numerous variations in our general sexual culture
. . . . She may speak if her voice soothes, entertains, informs, or otherwise
helps to serve male needs. What she may not do is express her own needs or
views . . . .”).
112. Henderson, supra note 102, at 141–42 (discussing the “no means yes”
assumption); see also Oberman, supra note 90, at 394 (noting that in an honest
conversation with the trial judge in the John Z. case, the judge acknowledged
that as a kid he never would have taken the first “no” seriously).
113. One 1988 survey found that thirty-nine percent of women at a Texas
university indicated that they did not want to have sex even though they did.
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say
No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token
Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872 (1988).
114. Baker, supra note 53, at 675–79 (discussing the link between sexual
performance and idealized masculinity).
115. E.g., Baker, supra note 26, at 606 (examining instances where men
used sexual conquests as a kind of competition with other men).
116. The rape reform movement included attempts to educate men about
the harms of acquaintance rape, but studies conducted of college populations
suggest that these training programs often fall short in transforming the way
men think about potential hook-up partners. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex and
Equality, 93 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 663 (2013) (citing hook-up culture studies
and how disregarding women’s desires is commonplace).
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“when so many rapes involve honest men and violated wom117
en . . . is the woman raped but not by a rapist?” Susan Estrich
advised, “[i]t is easier to condemn date rape than it is to punish
118
date rapists.” Professor Lynne Henderson saw this as a retribution/deterrence tradeoff. To really conflate acquaintance and
stranger rapists was to say all rapists were deserving of the
same severe penalty, but making the penalty that severe for a
crime that was being perpetrated by so many peoples’ brothers
and sons would inevitably lead to under-enforcement:
Feminists are caught in a bind between the arguments for retributive
punishment and deterrence of the crime of rape. Because all rape is a
form of soul-murder, a life-threatening, and life-damaging experience,
proportionality would seem to demand heavy penalties. . . . Practically, however, a patriarchal society will not tolerate imposition of heavy
penalties on large numbers of men for raping women, at least in the
119
short term.

Even as these reformers were analyzing the likely problems with making the commonplace criminal, there was a competing, though superficially sympathetic, movement which
sought to re-invigorate the notion that rapists—real rapists—
were particularly dangerous. The result was a series of toughon-rapists initiatives that undermined the reformist goal of expanding the amount of legally proscribed activity.
In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
120
Program. This program predicated the receipt of federal money for law enforcement on states developing registration systems for people convicted of certain sexual offenses. In 1997,
Congress amended the Act to include a notification system, so
not only did states have to develop systems for tracking those
who had committed sexual offenses, they had to inform the
public if someone who had committed such offenses was in its
121
midst.

117. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 183 (1989).
118. Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5, 32–33 (1992).
119. Henderson, supra note 102, at 175–76.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1) (West 2000) (repealed 2006). This Act and the
state statutes it engendered are often named after victims. The most famous
one may be New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law.” See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & POL’Y 569, 569–71 (1995) (describing the New Jersey legislation).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2).
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In enacting these registration and notification systems,
state legislatures routinely relied on scientifically unsupported,
but generally accepted, notions that rapists are uniquely recidivistic and sexually perverse. Rapists are different, it was im122
plicitly argued, so they need special rules.
In reality, there is no evidence that rapists recidivate at a
123
rate any higher than other criminals. Nor is there any supporting evidence that most rapists are psychologically im124
paired. Registration and notification programs are rooted in
an unsupported belief that rapists are “other”; that they are
uniquely deviant. The rapid passage of registration and notifi125
cation laws demonstrates how easy it is to reify and exacerbate an understanding of rapists as psychopaths.
Notification rules are especially pernicious in this regard.
Being branded by the government and having one’s presence in
a community announced because of that branding, obviously
stigmatizes those who are branded. One study in Wisconsin
found that notification routinely resulted in ostracization, harassment, and negative impacts on family and friends of the of126
fenders. No one denies this stigmatizing effect; it was just
thought appropriate to the offense of rape and necessary in or127
der to protect the public from rapists.
122. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a) (West 1994) (“The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and . . . the dangers posed by persons who prey
on others as a result of mental illness . . . .”), with N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168
(McKinney 1998) (connecting the legislative findings and intent to the “danger
of recidivism”).
123. See generally Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the
Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81
B.U. L. REV. 127, 158 n.135 (2001) (citing a number of studies that found rapists did not have higher recidivism rates than other types of offenders).
124. See Gene G. Abel, Judith V. Becker & Linda J. Skinner, Aggressive
Behavior and Sex, 3 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 133, 140 (1980) (asserting
that less than five percent of rapists were psychotic at the time of the commission of rape); James V. P. Check & Neil Malamuth, An Empirical Assessment
of Some Feminist Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT’L J. WOMEN’S STUD. 414, 415
(1985) (psychologists consistently fail to find evidence of abnormality among
rapist populations); Paul Schewe & William O’Donohue, Rape Prevention:
Methodological Problems and New Directions, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY REV.
667, 668–72 (1993) (finding no significant psychological differences between
rapist and nonrapist populations).
125. See Wells & Motley, supra note 123, at 132 n.22 (demonstrating that
nearly all states now have very similar registration laws).
126. Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 381–84 (2000).
127. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168.
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Yet many people do not feel the need to be protected from
all the brothers and sons who expropriate sex from women
without consent, nor do they likely see the need to stigmatize
men who are conforming to social norms. When notification and
registration laws validate the idea that rapists are uniquely
dangerous it becomes much harder for everyone, from judge to
juror to prosecutor to victim, to see the boy next door as a rap128
ist.
There are other parts of the conservative campaign that
single rapists out as uniquely dangerous and thereby undermine the feminist attempts to indict the status quo. In the
1990s, many states adopted special civil commitment proce129
dures for sexual predators, even though most of those states
already had mechanisms in place that provided for civil com130
mitment of the mentally ill. This suggests (again, without
any medical justification) that rapists are somehow uniquely
mentally ill or, for some reason, worthy of civil commitment
131
even in the absence of mental illness.
Comparably, in passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413–
415, which allow prior sexual offenses to be introduced in order
to establish that the defendant has a sexual assaulter’s character, Congress relied on the demonstrably false proposition that
132
rapists constitute a “small class of depraved criminals.” Not
only is there no evidence that rapists are rare or depraved, the
rape reform movement that preceded the tough-on-rapists

128. Consider the response of the CNN reporters discussing the verdict in
the Stuebenville rape case immediately after it came down, “the most severe
thing with these young men is being labeled as sex offenders.” Wemple, supra
note 95.
129. See Wells & Motley, supra note 123, at 135–37.
130. See Stephen Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments
on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 94–96 (1996).
131. In upholding sexual predator statutes, the Supreme Court indicated
that states could set their own criteria for determining who should be confined
civilly. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359–60 (1997).
132. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 15, 19–26 (1994). Mr.
Karp’s views, originally expressed in a speech to the Association of American
Law Schools, were referenced by the sponsors of FED. R. EVID. 413–15, Representative Susan Molinari and Senator Bob Dole. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991
(daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); id. at S24,799 (daily ed.
Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole). Mr. Karp served as Senior Counsel at
the Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice.
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campaign was premised on the notion that rape was commonplace. Many men did it; that was the problem.
What is surprising about the tough-on-rapists movement is
not necessarily its success. Much of the push was initiated at
the federal level, with federal funds attached, at a time when
both houses of Congress were growing increasingly conservative and a Democratic president had no desire to appear soft on
133
crime, particularly sexual crime. What is surprising is how
little resistance the tough-on-rapists movement encountered
from feminists. There was minimal public opposition to these
measures even though just a bit of reflection shows how much
they reject the feminist insights at the core of the rape reform
134
movement. It took less than twenty years for most state legislatures to, first, override the traditional approach to rape in order to greatly expand the class of offenses that might be crimi135
nalized as sexual assault, and then, second, institute unique
forms of punishment that inevitably restricted the number of
men whom the criminal justice system would be willing to classify as rapists. No one commented on the whiplash.
IV. AGENCY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
The third major impediment for rape reform grew out of
the delicate relationship between victim injury, victim agency
and the criminal law. This Part demonstrates how rape’s injury
is exceedingly difficult to predict, as it more often dependent on
a victim’s psychological and cultural understanding of sex, than
on an objective understanding of force or threat. Moreover,
many victims appear to have both the power and desire to try
to minimize their injury. Their desire to do this is magnified by
133. Democratic President Bill Clinton had a notorious reputation as a
“womanizer,” and was almost impeached for lying about the sexual affair he
had with a White House intern. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR
OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON 1 (1999) (discussing the conduct and subsequent impeachment of
President Clinton).
134. Kristin Bumiller later wrote about the uncomfortable alliance between
some mainstream feminists and conservative crime-control advocates, see
KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2008), but there
was little public outcry and virtually no mobilization of the political forces that
pushed the initial rape reforms. For a discussion of the tensions between the
tough-on-rapists movement and feminism insights, see generally Baker, supra
note 26, and Wells & Motley, supra note 123.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
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a criminal law process that requires them to abdicate their own
agency and subject themselves to relentless critiques of their
sexual experience. Finally, the criminal law requires victims to
label their friends, acquaintances and friends of acquaintances
as rapists and indict the status quo in which they all live. It
appears to be much easier for many victims to just not bother.
A. VICTIM INJURY AND AGENCY
The history of the law’s treatment of rape, discussed in
Part I, suggests that there still may not be consensus on how,
why and when rape victims are injured. In certain situations,
most obviously in paradigmatic violent stranger rape scenarios,
everyone agrees that there is victim injury. Professor
Rubenfeld suggests that injury comes from the invasion of the
136
victim’s right to self-possession; the liberal view suggests that
it comes from the interference with the victim’s autonomy because it involves a nonconsensual touching of a physiologically
137
and emotionally meaningful part of the body; the Model Penal Code, though not clear on what the injury from rape is, at
138
least makes clear that rape’s injury is unique. “Offensive
Touching” under the Code is treated as its own crime, complete139
ly distinct from battery, which must involve “physical injury.”
Other contemporary commentators have argued that the best
legal framework for conceptualizing rape is larceny; rape is
kind of theft, though not—as it was for the Romans—from the
140
husband or father, but from the woman herself.
Because so much of rape’s injury stems from the sexual nature of the act, not the physical harm with which most of the

136. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47.
137. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 20.
138. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860.
139. See id. (“The modern approach, as reflected in the Model Penal Code,
is to limit battery to instances of physical injury and cover unwanted sexual
advances by other statutes.”); ALI Draft, supra note 23 (adopting the approach
to distinguish sexual offenses from other batteries).
140. Richard Posner at one time championed the commodification framework as the best way to think about rape. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 202 (3d ed. 1986); see also Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape:
An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of
Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1805 (1992) (suggesting that “we once again
think about rape as an offense against property”); Yung, supra note 39 (manuscript at 34) (interpreting and endorsing various other commentators whom he
says have argued that “rape is essentially the theft of sex”).
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141

law of battery is concerned, rape’s injury is exceedingly difficult to measure. This hardly makes it trivial or unworthy of
criminal protection, but it does mean that rape’s injury is likely
to be highly subjective. It explains why so little of rape’s injury
can be predicted by the nature of the act and so much depends
142
on the belief structures of the victim and those around her.
As Professor Gowri Ramachandran argued in response to Professor Rubenfeld, much of rape’s injury is related to the “cul143
tural valence” of sex. That cultural valence is necessarily contingent on individual psychological factors and social norms.
Most feminists writing about the injury of rape have emphasized the relationship between rape and fear. Lynne Henderson, bravely describing her own rape, explains that rape involves the “phenomenological harm of thinking you are
144
experiencing your own death.” Michelle Anderson introduces
one of her articles with a vivid account of a thirteen-year-old
girl, frozen with fear, being “non-violently” raped by a sixteen145
year-old neighbor. Robin West argues that “[t]he experience
of rape . . . [involves] fear for one’s own imminent death, and
146
the pain of nonconsensual physical touching.”
West and Henderson both also suggest that rape’s injury
involves a kind of psychological harm that is distinct from fear.
147
West uses the phrase “spiritual murder.” Henderson uses the

141. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860.
142. In rejecting Professor Rubenfeld’s self-possession theory, Professor
Gowri Ramachandran argues that “Rubenfeld’s self-possession concept ignores
that sex is particularly meaningful in both good and bad ways, for reasons beyond the possession of one partner’s body by the other. The reasons sex is special range from its unique long-term physical risks (pregnancy and disease) to
its cultural valence.” Ramachandran, supra note 46, at 375; see Amy L. Brown
& Maria Testa, Social Influences on Judgments of Rape Victims: The Role of
the Negative and Positive Social Reactions of Others, 58 SEX ROLES 490, 496–
97 (2008) (reporting on the variety of factors, including sex-role socialization,
acceptance of rape myths (in both the victim and the victim’s community), as
well as the availability of primary and secondary social support networks as
having a significant effect on victim injury).
143. Ramachandran, supra note 46, at 375.
144. Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 193, 227 (1987).
145. Anderson, supra note 31, at 1401–02.
146. Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 232 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds.,
2010).
147. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond
Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (1993).
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148

phrase “soul murder.” Janet Halley understands this depic149
tion of rape’s harm as involving a “breakdown of selfhood.”
Social science data confirms that rape can be incredibly injurious psychologically. “[R]ape is one of the most severe of all
150
traumas, causing multiple, long-term negative outcomes.” Between 17% and 65% of female rape victims with a lifetime history of sexual assault develop post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD); between 13% and 51% of rape victims are clinically de151
pressed; between 12% to 40% suffer from anxiety. Many rape
survivors develop dependencies on alcohol or other illicit sub152
stances.
The severity of these injuries does not depend on whether
153
the perpetrator was a stranger. Some studies suggest that
victims of stranger rapes recover sooner and have lower levels
154
of psychological distress than victims of acquaintance rape.
Other studies find that stranger rapes and partner rapes (as
opposed to acquaintance rapes) may produce the most severe
155
PTSD, while acquaintance rapes produce higher levels of self156
blame.
The amount of force used is not necessarily predictive of injury either. Some studies have found a correlation between
157
force used in rape and post-assault distress, but others have
158
not. The relationship between violence and trauma may be
curvilinear, with victims of very high levels and very low levels
148. Henderson, supra note 144, at 225.
149. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 63 (2006).
150. Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual
Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225, 225
(2009).
151. Id. at 225–26 (citing multiple studies).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 232 (citing studies).
154. B. Katz, The Psychological Impact of Stranger vs. Nonstranger Rape
on Victim’s Recovery, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 27, at 267.
155. See Campbell et al., supra note 150, at 232 (citing studies).
156. Bonnie L. Katz & Martha R. Burt, Self-Blame in Recovery from Rape,
in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT II 151, 162 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988).
157. Sarah E. Ullman & Judith M. Siegal, Victim-Offender Relationship
and Sexual Assault, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 121, 129 (1993); I. T. Bownes et
al., Assault Characteristics and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Victims, 83 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA 27, 27 (1991).
158. See Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Factors Predicting Psychological Distress
Among Rape Victims, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 113, 131 (Charles R. Figley,
ed., 1984); Beverly M. Atkeson et al., Victims of Rape: Repeated Assessment of
Depressive Symptoms, 50 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 96, 101 (1982).
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159

the most traumatized. Given these divergent findings, it is
not particularly surprising that a literature review concludes
that the “mental health consequences of rape are caused by
160
multiple factors beyond characteristics of . . . the assault.” In
other words, there may be no correlation between the kind of
rape or the perceived culpability of the defendant, and the
161
harm inflicted on the victim.
One factor that has been found to decrease both the risk of
injury and the likelihood of rape is resistance. Michelle Anderson reports that contrary to what some reformers argued about
the futility of resistance, resistance is effective in reducing
162
rape, while not increasing the chance of injury. Passive, non163
resisting victims are especially likely to blame themselves,
and self-blame is a significant factor in the extent of a rape vic164
tim’s injury. Studies indicate that self-blame decreases the
rate of a victim’s recovery, increases the chance of PTSD, and
lessens the likelihood that the victim will report the crime or
165
seek help for her injuries. One study of the effectiveness of
rape resistance found that, during the attack, women who
avoided rape were thinking about avoiding rape, while most
166
rape victims were thinking about avoiding death.
Professor Anderson does not argue for the reinstatement of
the resistance requirement, only for the recognition that wom159. See Garrison, supra note 61, at 624 (citing studies).
160. Campbell et al., supra note 150, at 238.
161. The criminal law is accustomed to situations in which the culpability
of the perpetrator is directly proportional to the harm done the victim.
162. Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 983, 985 (1998).
163. Id. at 988.
164. See Katz & Burt, supra note 156, at 160 (asserting that self-blame is a
significant component of injury). It is important to note that self-blame is often
dependent on a host of factors that have absolutely nothing to do with the incident itself. Traditional gender attitudes and rape myth acceptance are
strongly correlated with how much individuals blame the victim and the more
others blame the victim, the more likely she is to blame herself. See Brown &
Testa, supra note 142, at 496.
165. Anderson, supra note 162, at 989.
166. PAULINE B. BART & PATRICIA H. O’BRIEN, STOPPING RAPE: SUCCESSFUL SURVIVAL STRATEGIES 110–11 (1985). This finding begs questions about
the injury of rape, though it also might reflect the wisdom of victims. Victims
who believe their lives to be at stake would rather be raped than killed, so
they do not resist. For further discussion of Professor Henderson’s explanation
of rape’s injury, see Henderson, supra note 102 (stating that victims fear murder). For other victims who do not sense that their life is at stake, it is worth
resisting rape.
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en should—for their own sake—be taught to resist. They are
167
less likely to feel injured if they do. One way to resist being a
rape victim—the way Anderson describes—is to fight the man
off with fists and knees and teeth and screams. Another way is
to resist the definition of rape. “Research has consistently
found that a large percentage of women—typically over 50%—
who have experienced vaginal, oral or anal intercourse against
their will label their experience as something other than
168
rape.”
Mary Koss interviewed victims of stranger rape: 55% of
them considered it rape, 15% thought it was a crime different
169
than rape and 8% did not believe they were victimized. In her
study of twenty-seven young women who had sexual experience
that involved force or coercion, Lynn Phillips found that the
vast majority did not label their experience as abuse or victimi170
zation. Regardless of what they were told the legal definition
of rape is, subject participants let their own understanding of
171
rape dictate what they were willing to label as rape. When
asked whether they have ever experienced a given situation,
and that situation is described with the statutory definitions of
rape instead of the term “rape” itself, women report a rate of
victimization that is eleven times greater than when the word
172
rape is used.
Consider the following quotes, all taken from women describing what they labeled as a “bad hook-up” experience.

167. Anderson, supra note 162, at 982.
168. Arnold S. Kahn et al., Calling It Rape: Differences in Experiences of
Women Who Do or Do Not Label Their Sexual Assault as Rape, 27 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN’S Q. 233, 233 (2003).
169. Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Differences in the Victim’s Experience, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 6 (1988).
170. LYNN M. PHILLIPS, FLIRTING WITH DANGER: YOUNG WOMEN’S REFLECTIONS ON SEXUALITY AND DOMINATION 196 (2000).
171. Heather Littleton et al., Risky Situation or Harmless Fun? A Qualitative Examination of College Women’s Bad Hook-up and Rape Scripts, 60 SEX
ROLES 793, 802 (2009) [hereinafter Risky Situation]; see also Heather Littleton
et al., Rape Acknowledgement and Post Assault Behaviors: How Acknowledgement Status Relates to Disclosure, Coping, Worldview and Reactions Received
from Others, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 761, 762 (2006) [hereinafter Rape
Acknowledgement] (stating students resist adopting a definition of rape that is
inconsistent with what their “rape script” tells them rape is).
172. Leah E. Adams-Curtis & Gordon B. Forbes, College Women’s Experiences of Sexual Coercion: A Review of Cultural, Perpetrator, Victim and Situational Variables, 5 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 91, 98 (2004).
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I was trapped at a party. I wanted to get out of
173
there.
He just mauled me in my drunken stupor. I
174
wanted to cry and throw up. I felt used.
He forced sex on me when I was obviously dis175
interested. I just wanted it to be over.
He didn’t respect my requests. He used me for
176
his own physical pleasure.
I wouldn’t say no, but I wouldn’t say yes either.
So I was passive and he’s kind of a forceful
177
guy.
[They] took advantage [that] I was wasted. I felt
horrible and used and experienced pain for
178
days.
One could conclude, as Professor Rubenfeld presumably would,
that because the men involved in these incidents did not use
179
force to get sex, these women were not raped. One could conclude, using Lynne Henderson’s reflections, that these women
were not raped because they did not experience the “phenomenological harm of thinking [they] were experiencing [their] own
180
death.” If one uses the affirmative consent standard devel181
oped in some states and often adopted by universities for
182
their codes of conduct, all of these women could be considered
173. Elizabeth L. Paul & Kristen A. Hayes, The Causalities of Casual Sex:
A Qualitative Exploration of the Phenomenology of College Students’ Hookups,
19 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 639, 654 (2002).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 655.
176. Id. at 657–58.
177. Laina Y. Bay-Cheng & Rebecca K. Eliseo-Arras, The Making of Unwanted Sex: Gendered and Neoliberal Norms in College Women’s Unwanted
Sexual Experiences, 45 J. SEX RES. 386, 394 (2008).
178. See Paul & Hayes, supra note 173.
179. Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld would probably argue that the victims in
the studies understood what “rape” is, while the reformers and legislators who
changed so many legal definitions did not. See supra text accompanying notes
42–47.
180. Henderson, supra note 144.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37.
182. Many universities already require an affirmative consent standard.
See, e.g., Office of the Dean of Students, Sexual Misconduct at the University of
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victims of rape or sexual assault. If one used the moderate def183
inition of force, like the one used by the judge in John Z., these women would probably also be rape victims.
Research with college-age populations has found that in incidents like those just described, women:
did not believe they were personally at risk and they attributed their
undesired sex not to the man’s pressure or force but to their own lack
of ability to think clearly or resist. . . . These women seem to have
presumed that men are going to have sex with a woman unless the
woman forcefully resists, and her inability to resist meant to [them]
184
that what happened was not rape.

Comparably, Professors Laina Bay-Cheng and Rebecca
Eliseo-Arras have argued that the “neoliberal” rhetoric of “selfdetermination and personal responsibility . . . lead[s] women to
185
blame themselves for unwanted sex.”
Professor Michelle Oberman and I have recently argued
that women help protect themselves against rape’s injury by
186
constructing away the crime. Raised to believe they have
sexual agency even if research continues to confirm that they
do not usually exercise it, young women today would rather see
their failure to resist as an affirmative act that resulted in unwanted sex, than see his failure to stop as the affirmative act
that resulted in rape. Women’s understanding of their own
agency may help diminish any injury: “Perhaps the spirit is not
murdered if women interpret their decision not to fight back, to
get it over with, to let it happen, as a kind of control that keeps
187
their souls intact.”
Given that rape’s injury is so dependent on the psychological and cultural construction of sex, there are powerful reasons
to resist thinking of oneself as having been raped. People “regard[] rape as a potentially life-altering experience that has a
Oregon, UNIV. OF OR. (2013), https://uodos.uoregon.edu/StudentConductand
CommunityStandards/SexualMisconduct.aspx; Student Manual: University
Policies & Regulations, UNIV. OF CHI. 8, http://studentmanual.uchicago
.edu/sites/studentmanual.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/StudentManual_2014
-15%20updated%20032615.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); Yale University
Sexual Misconduct Scenarios, YALE UNIV. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://smr.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/Sexual-Misconduct-Scenarios.pdf.
183. See Oberman, supra note 90, at 387.
184. Arnold S. Kahn et al., Calling It Rape, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN’S Q. 233,
240 (2003).
185. Bay-Cheng & Eliseo-Arras, supra note 177, at 388.
186. See generally Baker & Oberman, supra note 32 (examining sexual
agency of young women).
187. Id. at 47.
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persistent and perhaps life-long negative impact.” Professor
Anderson quotes one resister, who was physically injured while
she resisted, but who avoided being raped: “[T]hank goodness
he broke my jaw instead of raping me. I like my sex life. I didn’t
want my sex life screwed up. A broken jaw is easy to deal
189
with.”
Can one help oneself avoid a “screwed up” sex life and “lifelong negative impacts” by interpreting a past event as within
190
one’s control even if one did not feel in control at the time? If
one has not been raped, one does not necessarily have to blame
oneself for letting the rape happen. One might blame oneself
for getting too drunk, or having sex one didn’t want, but the extent and severity of the blame are likely different—precisely
because rape is socially understood as more traumatic than
that. If one can avoid life-altering injury by interpreting away
the crime, isn’t that a particularly effective form of resistance?
Recall the rape reform movement’s desire to give women
voice, to respect women’s decision-making capacity and prevent
the law from assuming her consent. In order to do that, rape
laws were re-written to allow for rape convictions even if women did not exercise agency or make a clear decision. The laws
were designed to incorporate the reality of women’s passivity,
but many contemporary women reject that depiction of themselves. Whether they act passively or not, they do not want to
see themselves or have others see them as passive.
The irony here is striking. Potential rape victims are—in
fact if not in law—resurrecting the resistance requirement, the
one traditional element of the crime that no one defends on
theoretical grounds. In their own minds, they were not raped
because they had the ability to resist and chose not exercise it.
In cases where one is not phenomenologically experiencing
one’s own murder, believing in one’s own agency may be the
best resistance strategy there is.

188. Risky Situation, supra note 171, at 801.
189. Anderson, supra note 162, at 984. Rape victims are more likely than
the rest of the population to experience fear of sex and arousal dysfunction.
See Patricia A. Resick, The Psychological Impact of Rape, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 223, 232–33 (1993). These studies assume that someone identifies
as a rape victim.
190. At least one study has found that victims’ conceptualization of the assault can be influenced by experiences after the assault. See Rape Acknowledgment, supra note 171, at 774.
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This re-envisioning of the event may not work in the long
term. Given the psychological nature of rape’s injury, even
women who attempt to construct away their injury may still
have life-altering consequences. At least one study concluded
that “[b]oth unacknowledged and acknowledged victims [of
forced, unwanted or incapacitated sex] reported elevated psychological distress, damage to their worldview, and engaging in
191
extensive coping efforts.” These injuries often manifest themselves later, after memories have faded and many people have
moved on. The idea of pursuing the assailant after so much
time has passed is even more difficult than pursuing him directly after the assault.
B. VICTIM AGENCY AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
Even for women who do not try to re-envision the event so
as to give themselves more agency, the importance of reclaiming their sense of agency can explain why they do not turn to
the criminal law for prosecution. By invoking the criminal regime designed to protect them, rape victims can make their injury worse.
A woman who reports as a rape victim is usually taken
first to medical authorities who scrutinize her story for possible
medical implications. Then she is confronted by police who
must scrutinize her story to determine whether they should
proceed. If she is convincing enough for the police, she is taken
to the prosecutor, who—as the General Sinclair saga undoubtedly shows—must scrutinize her story to determine whether it
is an appropriate one for prosecution. And, if it is an appropriate one for prosecution, she must be prepared to tell her story,
again and again and again, publicly. She must arm herself
against an onslaught of (perfectly appropriate) attacks on her
credibility by the defense team, and ultimately surrender the
decisions about how her story gets told to the prosecuting attorneys, who take command of the case. It is hard to imagine a
process more potentially damaging to one’s agency.
Women who choose not to press charges may realize how
injurious the process itself is likely to be and allow that to
guide their decision. Studies confirm that women who pursue
criminal prosecution suffer from more self-doubt and self-blame

191. Id.
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192

than those who do not. And it is self-doubt and self-blame
that are associated with greater PTSD. Winning at trial does
not necessarily alleviate the injury. The victim in John Z. was
193
devastated by the trial, and the victim in the Steubenville
194
case was ostracized.
In sum, there are a multitude of reasons why victims may
be resistant to acknowledging they were raped and/or using the
criminal process designed to redress their injury. If one sees
oneself as a victim, one acknowledges a powerlessness and a
lack of control. One has failed to be the agent one wants to be.
If one experiences the act as traumatic, regardless of how empowered one felt during it, the healthiest response may be to
195
block out the specifics of the crime. This makes many victims
bad witnesses. To become a better witness, indeed, to make it
at all possible for the criminal justice system to vindicate their
injuries, they must re-live the traumatic incident, over and over
again, and have their interpretation of the events subject to
constant scrutiny by allies, foes and theoretically neutral
strangers.
Feminist and other critics of the law’s treatment of rape
have maintained for years that entrenched misogyny and pa196
triarchy lead to police unfounding cases, prosecutors refusing
to prosecute cases and defense counsel being given liberty to
197
torment victims on the stand. That critique may have merit,
but even if reformers were able to dislodge all that misogyny
and patriarchy, the context in which most acquaintance rape
happens, the means of establishing facts at trial, and the protections that our system must afford criminal defendants inevitably result in a process for rape enforcement that is likely to

192. See Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the
“Second Assault”: Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 853, 856 (1994) (citing various studies showing that “prosecution per
se harms victims”) One of these studies showed “that women whose cases were
prosecuted were less well off psychologically six months after the rape than
were those whose cases were not prosecuted.” Id.
193. See Oberman, supra note 90, at 397.
194. See Macur & Schweber, supra note 95, at D7 (observing that the victim has been ostracized by the community).
195. See Garrison, supra note 61.
196. Police “unfound” cases when they determine that the victims’ accounts
are not credible enough. See Schafran, supra note 98.
197. See supra note 98.
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exacerbate the unique psychological injuries that rape victims
198
suffer.
C. VICTIM INJURY AND BLAME
It is not only themselves that rape victims want to protect
when they resist the label rape. Victims are often uncomfortable labeling the men who were negligent, recklessly indifferent
with regard to consent, or even a bit forceful, as rapists. Over
the last twenty years there has been extensive academic theo199
rizing on the appropriate mens rea for rape, but the only decision maker that really matters in this inquiry is the victim. If
she does not see the man as culpable, she will not label what
happened to her as rape. Consider the comments of one college
student: “there were reasons these guys were led to believe I
200
would do those things.” Of course there were reasons that
“those guys” thought they could do what they did. Everyone
was following the sexual scripts that rape reform tried to rewrite. Everyone had learned that her not saying no was permission for him to go forward. The law can try to revoke that
permission, but if individuals still internalize the script, victims are not going to feel comfortable charging “those guys”
with rape.
The tough-on-rapists movement described in Part III
makes the idea of labeling such incidents as rape all the more
difficult. What does it say about the women who might report
rape if by doing so they are saying that they, and probably their
friends, enjoyed socializing with, and often having consensual
sex with, the kind of deviant psychopaths whom we single out
for stigmatizing treatment because they are rapists?
Champions of the force requirement might use women’s reluctance to blame men as proof that rape requires force. As a
198. See supra Part II.
199. See also Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 279–86 (discussing approaches
to negligence in rape trials). Compare ESTRICH, supra note 46, at 96–98 (advocating for a negligence standard), with LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 899 (“The
severe penalties imposed for [sexual assault] . . . and the serious loss of reputation following conviction make it extremely unlikely that the Legislature intended to exclude as to those offenses the element of wrongful intent.”). For a
comprehensive look at how incoherent and non-transparent the law with regard to mens rea for rape is and the interaction between statutory prescriptions and judicial determinations, see Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a
Mens Rea: Anatomy of Rape Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263 (2002).
200. Bay-Cheng & Eliseo-Arras, supra note 177 (describing perceived reasons for unwanted sexual experiences).
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theoretical matter, that reasoning is tautological; but as a practical matter, it is irrefutable. Women’s reluctance to blame men
for rape comes from the lingering cultural confusion over what
rape is. If everyone came to view the traditional sexual scripts
as pernicious and outdated, like the rule of thumb for domestic
201
violence, it would be much easier to blame men for proceeding
without consent. If people thought about consenting to sex the
way we think about consenting to a medical procedure, that is,
if people recognized that the decision of whether to go forward
is firmly vested in the person to be touched and invaded, not in
the doctor who may really want to operate, then the women
who currently resist blaming men would likely be much more
willing to do so. If rape reform had succeeded in dismantling
the old scripts, victims would likely see what “those guys” did
202
as “bad enough” to be willing to blame them.
As a practical matter, however, the power to expand the
scope of behavior that can be defined as rape is inevitably in
the hands of victims. If they believe in male entitlement, they
will not be willing to punish the men who are just pursuing
that to which they are entitled. As one of Elizabeth Paul’s college subjects said, perhaps not even realizing the power that
she had to make law and social meaning, “[w]hen you blame it
203
on the other person, it sounds rapish.” And if you choose not
blame it on someone else, it will not be rape.
V. THE PROMISE OF TITLE IX
A. ANOTHER CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
The draft changes to the Model Penal Code, circulated by
the American Law Institute last year, attempt to deal with the
failure of rape reform to change the norm of male entitlement
to sex by proposing not only more gradations in kinds of felony

201. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB, BATWOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 2 (1982), http://www
.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12w8410.pdf (explaining the
traditional rule that permitted a husband to beat his wife with any rod no
wider than his thumb).
202. Rubenfeld argues that many coercive and deceitful sexual acts short of
what he calls rape are not “that bad.” See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1416.
203. Elizabeth Paul, Beer Goggles, Catching Feelings, and the Walk of
Shame: The Myths and Realities of the Hookup Experience, in RELATING DIFFICULTY: THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING AND MANAGING DIFFICULT INTERACTION 141, 148 (D. Charles Kirkpatrick et al. eds., 2006).
TERED
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sexual assault crimes, but also a new misdemeanor, § 213.4,
204
called “Sexual Intercourse without Consent.” Section 213.4 is
205
an “embrace of an affirmative-consent requirement.” It makes
clear that no one should feel entitled to sex unless one’s partner
gives clear indications of consent. According to the drafters, by
making a misdemeanor of going forward in the absence of consent, § 213.4 reflects “the increasing recognition that sexual assault is an offense against the core value of individual autonomy, the individual’s right to control the boundaries of his or her
sexual experience, rather than a mere exercise of physical dom206
inance.” By lessening the severity of the crime, from a felony
to a misdemeanor, the drafters also probably hoped to make it
easier for women to come forward to blame perpetrators.
While § 213.4 is certainly well-meaning, this Article—
particularly when filtered through the politics of modern criminal law enforcement—suggests that the adoption of this new
misdemeanor will do little to change the norm of male entitlement to sex. There may be convictions under § 213.4, but they
will likely be plea deals or trial verdicts that represent a compromise in a case that was really about force. No one will see
what change is arguably necessary before the norm of male entitlement to sex can change: the law punishing nonconsensual
sex qua nonconsensual sex.
Prosecutors do not like to lose. Their professional future,
and an efficient allocation of their department’s resources, de207
pend on them accumulating convictions at trial. Money spent
on a lost trial is wasted money. Thus, prosecutors will often
take a plea to a misdemeanor over a chance of an acquittal at
trial. Imagine again the General Sinclair case, but with no lies
about a cell phone and with an allegation of more force—
perhaps he really did pin her arms against her back or choke
her as he forced her mouth to his penis. As discussed in Part II,
even this “better” case will be exceedingly difficult to prove. It
simply would not be that hard for a defense team to sow the
seeds of reasonable doubt. In any standard prosecution, i.e., not
one being scrutinized by the national media because the mili204. See ALI Draft, supra note 23, § 213.4, at 67.
205. See id. § 213.4 cmt., at 68.
206. Id.
207. “Defeats at trial are costly for prosecutors, both because trials are
costly and because defeats are salient—they are relatively rare . . . and hence
vivid, both to prosecutors and to the public.” Stuntz, supra note 103.
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tary has gotten into so much trouble for not taking rape seri208
ously, the prosecution will know just how easily the defense
can create doubt and escape prosecution. They will take a plea
to the misdemeanor. And without a realistic possibility of a
conviction based on force, defendants will have little reason to
even plead to the misdemeanor.
Unlike the standard legislative expansion of criminal law,
which involves the enactment of a new law that is easier to
209
prove than the real crime it is targeting, the addition of
§ 213.4 will not create an offense that is any easier for the
prosecution to prove. Therefore it is very unlikely that prosecutors will bring cases under § 213.4 alone. Consider the late Professor William Stuntz’s example of the relationship between the
210
crime of burglary and the crime of possessing burglar’s tools.
Stuntz suggested that legislators enacted the second, lesser
crime to allow for prosecutions when it was too hard to establish guilt for the target crime of burglary (because proving burglary requires proving intent to commit burglary, which is difficult). More uniformly, Stuntz argued that when the elements of
a target crime are ABC, legislators often enact a new crime,
AB, which lets prosecutors choose whether to prosecute based
211
on their sense of C, regardless of whether they can prove C.
Hence, in reality, prosecutors are only likely to prosecute for
possession of burglar’s tools when they think that the defendant actually did intend to commit burglary.
The relationship between § 213.4 and the felony sexual assault provisions will not operate in the same way. It will be no
easier to prove sex without consent than it is to prove sex with
force. Indeed, it may be more difficult. The traditional definition of rape required “(A) carnal knowledge of a woman, . . . (B)
212
through force, and (C) against her will.” The most serious
sexual assault offenses still usually require (A) “an act of sexual intercourse (B), secured through “physical force . . . or . . .
213
threat of physical force.” Section 213.4 suggests that B is not

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.
See Stuntz, supra note 103, at 537.
See id. at 538.
Id. at 519.
See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 891.
See, e.g., ALI Draft supra note 23, § 213.1, at 1.
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always necessary. Thus there is a crime in AC, not only in ABC
214
or AB.
Section 213.4 embodies the rape reformer ideal, but eliminating B does not make the prosecutors’ proof any easier. Proving B (force) has always established C (lack of consent), but
proving C on its own, as discussed above, is incredibly difficult.
It is not at all akin to proving the possession of burglar’s tools.
There is little reason to presume that prosecutors will believe
they can win a conviction for AC any more easily than they
could win a conviction for AB or ABC.
Thus, there is little reason to believe that prosecutors will
ever bother to try a § 213.4 case on its own, without some sort
of threat of a more serious conviction as well. AC cases will be
too hard to win and the payoff, because it is only a misdemeanor, will be small. No prosecutor will bother. This means that
notwithstanding the potential symbolic effect of criminalizing
215
sex without consent, no one will see the criminal law punishing sex without consent, because prosecutors will not prosecute
the crime. The criminal law will not be effective in shifting the
norm of male entitlement to sex.
B. THE CIVIL LAW DIFFERENCE
The Department of Education’s (DOE) recent campaign to
recast sexual assault as a problem of sex discrimination, not
necessarily a problem of criminal law enforcement, minimizes
most of the impediments to rape reform identified above. Everyone’s perspective and incentives can change once sexual assault is seen as a campus-wide behavioral problem, the responsibility for which resides with the university. For it to work,
though, everyone must understand that the campus process is
not necessarily convicting “rapists.” Campus tribunals should
not present themselves as criminal courts, and they should
214. Reformers also argued that rape could involve many forms of nonconsensual sexual activity in addition to “carnal knowledge.” See supra text accompanying note 24.
215. Oberman and I have endorsed keeping the “baseline of no” laws even
if they are primarily symbolic because that symbolism sends an important
message about the importance of mutuality in sex. See Baker & Oberman, supra note 32. Stuntz notes that the symbolic effect of a norm-pushing law that
is not prosecuted may cut in opposite directions. On the one hand, establishing
a crime of nonconsensual sex may send an important message about what the
state views as wrong. On the other hand, seeing the state never enforce that
crime “might send precisely the opposite message.” Stuntz, supra note 103, at
521.
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fight any outside attempts to construe them as such. As Catharine MacKinnon understood twenty-five years ago, when so
many women feel violated by behavior that conforms to established norms, the problem is that women are raped, “but not by
216
[] rapist[s].” University procedures must focus more on helping the women who are hurt than on punishing the men as rapists.
1. The Problems Avoided
a. Underenforcement
With a civil, intra-university regime, there will not be the
same disincentive problems, just discussed, with bringing sexual assault cases at the margins that involve non-consent without force. Unlike criminal prosecutors who have to worry about
their own careers if they prosecute a hard-to-win case that results in an acquittal, the DOE has made clear that universities
have to worry about the opposite problem. “Regardless of
whether a harassed student . . . files a complaint under the
school’s grievance procedures . . . a school that knows, or reasonably should know, about possible harassment must promptly investigate to determine what occurred and then take appro217
priate steps to resolve the situation.” Unlike prosecutors,
whose decisions not to prosecute routinely escape any kind of
218
scrutiny, the DOE articulates a plan to scrutinize all deci219
sions not to prosecute. Indeed, a decision not to prosecute is
likely to be subject to more vigorous questioning than an investigation that ended in acquittal, because at least the latter result suggests that the university is taking the potentially discriminatory situation seriously. Moreover, universities have
very broad discretion to craft behavioral standards as they
choose; thus they can prohibit behavior that the state, through
220
the criminal law, could not prohibit.
216. See MACKINNON, supra note 117.
217. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE BACKGROUND, SUMMARY AND FAST FACTS 4 (2011)
[hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER].
218. See Stuntz, supra note 103, at 547–48 (noting prosecutors’ freedom not
to prosecute and the likelihood that they won’t prosecute a sympathetic defendant).
219. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 19.
220. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt.
1994) (noting that the university could punish an offense of “disrespect for
persons” even if it did not believe the student was guilty of rape); Holert v.
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b. Burden of Proof
The DOE has made the determination that universities
must use a preponderance of the evidence standard, not the
criminal standard or even a clear and convincing evidence
standard, in adjudicating matters of sexual assault and coer221
cion. An environment in which men feel free to remain indifferent to women’s feelings and desires is an environment in
which women are not likely to feel that they are being treated
222
with the equal respect and dignity that Title IX requires.
Women are entitled to redress if they can prove that men’s entitlement to nonconsensual sex has an injurious and discriminatory effect on their learning environment. Women do not
have to show bodily injury or psychological trauma in order to
make a compelling claim that the way men are treating them is
demeaning and having a detrimental effect on their educational
environment. Women can prove that by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that men continue to disregard their
consent when engaging in sex.
What women are not necessarily entitled to under Title IX
is the imposition of any kind of criminal conviction or criminal
sanction on the perpetrator. But universities need not—and indeed should not—conflate their internal disciplinary procedures with criminal proceedings. Precisely because discriminaUniv. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (explaining that though
cleared of criminal harassment charges, complainant could still be expelled
from the university for harassing behavior in violation of the university’s own
standards); Paul E. Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student’s Right To
Remain Silent in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1241, 1245–46 (1997) (noting universities have discretion to institute
their own moral and ethical requirements for conduct).
221. In its Dear Colleague Letter, issued on April 4, 2011, the Department
of Education explained that it believes that discrimination doctrine requires
that schools use a preponderance of the evidence standard, not beyond a reasonable doubt or a clear and convincing evidence standard for establishing
sexual harassment or violence. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at
10–11. A higher standard of proof would likely result in discrimination because women who were assaulted, but could only establish it with 55% or 65%
certainty, for instance, would not be able to secure any redress. See id.
222. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES,
OTHER STUDENTS OR THIRD PARTIES ii (2001) http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf, (detailing the compliance standards the DOE
uses to enforce Title IX and explaining that Title IX prohibits harassing conduct that “interfere[s] with a student’s academic performance and emotional
and physical well-being,” and that “[p]reventing and remedying sexual harassment in schools is essential to ensuring a safe environment in which students can learn”).
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tion requires a lesser standard of proof, it would be unfair to
the accused to have a university disciplinary action be treated
as a determination of criminality. It is not. It is a finding of discriminatory treatment that should not bring with it the moral
condemnation that criminal sanctions engender.
c. Criminal Stigma and Due Process
The difference in consequence between being found responsible for civil discrimination, or possibly a university-created
223
offense like “disrespect of persons,” and being found criminally responsible for rape or sexual assault provides the third reason why the DOE solution is likely to be more effective than
criminal rape reform. By identifying the men who treated them
badly, women will not necessarily be suggesting that these men
are pathological or even criminal. It is important that universities not treat the men that way.
Initial reports indicate that many universities have failed
to grasp their opportunity and responsibility to treat sexually
predatory behavior as something other than an incident of profound moral turpitude. Stories abound of universities running
what seem to be kangaroo courts, affording men little process
224
and expelling them after cursory fact-finding. All the DOE’s
guidance requires, however, is a “prompt and equitable resolu225
tion” of a sexual assault matter. The university must take
“prompt and effective steps to respond to sexual harassment or
226
violence,” but the guidance leaves it up to the university to
determine what those steps should be.
227
Public universities must provide due process, and many
commentators have argued that private universities owe any
228
accused student a comparably protective amount of process.
223. See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244.
224. See Judith Grossman, Opinion, A Mother, a Feminist, Aghast, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 17, 2013, at A15; James Taranto, Opinion, An Education in College
Justice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7–8, 2013, at A13; John Laureman, College Men Accused of Sexual Assault Say Their Rights Are Violated, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-16/college
-men-accused-of-sexual-assault-say-their-rights-violated (all reporting cases of
colleges affording defendants minimal protection and often expelling him).
225. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 8.
226. Id. at 16.
227. Id. at 12.
228. See Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Student Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy,
142 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 12–14 (arguing that due process, particularly the right
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That process probably requires a hearing, a right to counsel,
and notice, but these protections are not that difficult or costly
229
to provide.
The most problematic procedural protection in sexual misconduct hearings is the right to confront the witness. As Parts
II and IV detail, the process of preparing a witness for confrontation and the right of defendant’s counsel to scrutinize the
witness’ credibility are often brutal on those victims who dare
to press charges. On the other hand, the need to confront witnesses is strongest when credibility is crucial. If, as some critics
230
seem to suggest, it is essential that an accused student be
given the opportunity to confront his accuser in the manner afforded to him by the criminal law, then the process will inevi231
tably chill victims’ willingness to come forward.
There is no easy answer here. The right to confrontation
may be critical for men who have been falsely accused, but it is
232
demonstrably harmful to women who have been victimized. If
universities provide full criminal rights to alleged abusers
there will be underenforcement of the university rules proscribing predatory behavior, and there will very likely be more of
to cross-examine, is crucial in disciplinary hearings); Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University
Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 331–37 (1999) (arguing that universities
have a duty of good faith and fair dealing under contract law); Lisa
Tenerowicz, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A
Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 653, 687–92 (2001) (stating that the following ought to be present in student disciplinary proceedings: written notice of the charges, presumption of
innocence, impartial hearing, right to confront witnesses, and the right to
counsel).
229. Because a finding of sexual misconduct could result in suspension or
expulsion, and because these cases usually involve contested fact, “some kind
of hearing” is almost certainly necessary. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 35 U.S. 78, 95 n.5 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“A decision relating to the misconduct of a student requires a factual determination as to
whether the conduct took place or not. The accuracy of that determination can
be safeguarded by the sorts of procedural protections traditionally imposed
under the Due Process Clause.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (stating that serious disciplinary consequences demand a hearing). To date, many
universities seem to have resisted providing notice and opportunities for counsel, but it is not clear why they have been so resistant to these basic protections. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994)
(stating that a university must provide notice of charges against a defendant);
Grossman, supra note 224 (alleging that her son’s college disciplinary hearing
would not allow him representation).
230. See supra notes 6–8.
231. See supra Part IV.B.
232. See Martin & Powell, supra note 192.
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that behavior. The more robust the right to confrontation becomes, the less likely victims will be to come forward. Reasonable minds may differ on whether university cultures would ra233
ther accept an inevitable amount of predatory behavior, or an
adjudicatory system that potentially punishes people who have
not violated university rules. But that is the choice. It is folly to
suggest that a school can provide full criminal safeguards and
punish all or even most sexual assaults. For all of the reasons
elucidated above, the criminal process simply does not work
that well for these kinds of sexual encounters.
There may be acceptable alternatives to the traditional
right to confrontation. Courts have allowed victims to testify
out of sight of the accused, which may help diminish the trau234
235
ma. One commentator has suggested using audiotape; another has suggested allowing the defendant to present questions to the hearing board, which could then ask them of the
236
witness. Providing these procedures may be able to immunize
a university from a due process challenge, even if the university uses the preponderance standard to determine whether the
prohibited conduct occurred.
The best and most effective way of ensuring an adequate
amount of protective process for the accused, however, is to
simply reduce the severity of the penalty. The Supreme Court
has made clear on numerous occasions that procedural due process is a flexible doctrine and that the amount of process due
depends on the scope and nature of the liberty interest in jeop237
ardy. Understandably, because rape has been a crime for so
233. General Patton assumed as much of soldiers. “[I]n spite of [his] most
diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping” by his men.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 15, at 73.
234. See Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that procedure was adequately protective of defendant’s rights even
though witness was allowed to testify out of defendant’s sight).
235. Baker, supra note 228, at 25.
236. Tenerowicz, supra note 228, at 691.
237. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (holding that a biological
father who has not developed a relationship with his child is not due very
much process before his rights are terminated because his failure to develop a
relationship minimizes the importance of his liberty interest in an on-going
relationship with his child); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (discussing process due to foster parents before the
state removes a foster child and concluding that very little process is due because the risk of erroneous deprivation of the child being returned to his or her
natural parents is so small); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
(laying out balancing test that weighs the importance of the personal interest
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238

long and because so many people continue to view rapists as
239
distinctly evil, universities have tended to expel or at least
suspend anyone found responsible for any form of sexual assault, or even “disrespect of persons,” if that disrespect involved
240
sexual contact. But universities do not have to do so. In many
instances, particularly if the tribunal feels that situational factors (everyone was drunk, many other men were behaving the
same way, the verbal and non-verbal signals with regard to
consent were ambiguous for quite a while), it may be appropriate to render a relatively modest punishment, like a notation
on a college record and protection for the complainant.
DOE’s guidance requires that the complainant be protected
from having to encounter or worry about regularly encounter241
ing the perpetrator. This seems to suggest that DOE thinks
that perpetrators will not necessarily be suspended or expelled.
The less severe the punishment, the less the need for extensive,
confrontational process that runs the risk of deterring too many
women from coming forward.
Doing something small to an individual is not the same as
doing nothing at all, but many schools seem caught in an all or
nothing binary. In one incident made public by an alleged victim, Harvard University refused to ask an alleged perpetrator
to move dormitories, despite evidence that the alleged victim
was suffering severely from the perpetrator’s co-residence in
242
her dorm. The behavior in question skirted the line of what
243
the university officially prohibited. The University apparentat stake in light of the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, the value
of additional safeguards and the state’s interest in providing alternative or
lesser process).
238. See supra Part I.A.
239. See supra Part III.
240. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt.
1994) (finding that a university expelled a student for “disrespect of persons,”
even though a tribunal could not find that he had committed rape).
241. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 16–17 (suggesting
that escort services be provided to the complainant and that class schedules
and dorm assignments be coordinated so that the two students do not come
into regular contact with each other).
242. Dear Harvard: You Win, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/3/31/Harvard-sexual-assault.
243. This is the victim’s account of what happened:
He was a friend of mine and I trusted him. It was a freezing Friday
night when I stumbled into his dorm room after too many drinks. He
took my shirt off and started biting the skin on my neck and breast. I
pushed back on his chest and asked him to stop kissing me aggres-
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ly therefore felt powerless to ask the young man to re-locate, or
to reprimand him for behavior that while not a clear violation
of university sexual assault policy, would nonetheless seem to
244
be an obvious violation of appropriate student conduct norms.
Perhaps the administrators simply did not believe the alleged victim. If they thought she was making it up, or misremembering too much of it, then doing nothing is appropriate.
But if they believed her and still did nothing to reprimand obviously odious conduct that clearly had an on-going detrimental
effect on the victim, then Harvard rendered itself paralyzed for
no good reason. The idea that forcing a college student at one of
the most elite universities in the world to move dormitories is
somehow a kind of punishment that requires full criminal process is absurd. The accused would still be free to graduate, in
his chosen major, with his social networks intact.
In those instances in which it seems appropriate to render
a small individual punishment, it may also be appropriate to
institute a broader, community-wide measure aimed at changing norms. If everyone at the party was doing it, or everyone at
the school regularly does it, it may be especially unjust to single one man out for punishment, but particularly appropriate to
require much more comprehensive training and education for
the community at large. When it is clear that community norms
245
(which the university has the authority to set and enforce)
were violated, even if it is unclear who violated them, dormwide or fraternity-wide or household-wide punishments could
be imposed. For years, universities have used honor codes to
246
collectivize responsibility for individual transgressions. Suresively. He laughed. He said that I should “just wear a scarf” to cover
the marks. He continued to abuse my body, hurting my breast and
vagina. He asked me to use my mouth. I said no. I was intoxicated, I
was in pain, I was trapped between him and the wall, and I was
scared to death that he would continue to ignore what I said. I
stopped everything and turned my back to him, praying he would
leave me alone. He started getting impatient. “Are you only going to
make me hard, or are you going to make me come?” he said in a demanding tone. It did not sound like a question. I obeyed.
Id.
244. Students need some notice of what code of conduct standards are, but
it is hard to believe that this man could maintain that he thought his behavior
was consistent with a basic requirement of respect for other students. He was
probably entitled to be confused about whether his behavior constituted sexual
assault, but not about whether his behavior was appropriate.
245. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
246. See Eric Roberts, Honor Codes Across the Country, STANFORD UNIV.
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ly, if a school can impose punishment on student A because
student A knew or should have known student B cheated and
did not report it, then a school can impose punishment on student A because he knew or should have known that student B
was taking advantage of a fellow member of the community
who was too scared or too drunk to protect herself.
Thirty-five years ago, before Catharine MacKinnon pub247
lished Sexual Harassment of Working Women, most everyone
accepted the inevitability of boys being boys and the workplace
being inundated with lewd, obnoxious and pestering sexual behavior perpetrated by men toward women. Within twenty years
those norms had changed radically and most everyone knew
that previously commonplace behavior was inappropriate and
248
unfair to women. The norms of workplace behavior did not
change because everyone read MacKinnon’s book nor because
the perpetrators of the lewd, obnoxious behavior were thrown
in jail. The norms changed, in large part, because businesses
were found vicariously liable for the behavior of their employ249
ees. Sexual harassment training is now a part of almost every
workplace. If universities understood the problem of sexual assault the way employers understand the problem of sexual harassment, that is, as an environmental problem, likely created
and fostered elsewhere, but which nonetheless has become universities’ responsibility, universities could likely do much to
change the current culture that results in twenty percent of college women being assaulted.
d. The Agency Dilemma
There is still the issue of whether victims will be as resistant to labeling themselves as victims of discrimination as
they are to labeling themselves as victims of sexual assault.
Coming forward as a victim of discrimination may allow a vichttp://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/honor-code/honorcodes
.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (explaining standard honor code procedures
and linking to other schools that have them).
247. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
248. See Kahan, supra note 78, at 635 (citations omitted).
249. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–810 (1998)
(holding that an employer is held vicariously liable for discriminatory conduct
by a supervisor); Burlington Indus., Inc. v Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754–66 (1998)
(affirming that firms can be vicariously liable if they do not take affirmative
steps to prevent harassment).
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tim to identify as someone who is helping future women who
would be hurt by the same institutional forces, as opposed to
someone who blames a man because she was too weak to help
herself. Women still may not come forward, though. As Kristin
Bumiller revealed in her study of race and sex discrimination,
victims often distrust the legal process, resent the need for it,
and remain skeptical of how much good it can do. So they often
do not pursue legal remedies, even if they feel entitled to
250
them.
Bumiller’s work suggests that victims of discrimination
have complicated and mixed feelings about their victimization.
Victims on college campuses may feel the same way, but university disciplinary procedures offer a potentially more hospitable and nurturing process for victims than does the civil law.
Moreover, because universities are more closed, paternalistic
environments, they may be able to protect victims who do come
251
forward from being ostracized. At present, there is also a
groundswell of grassroots support for organizing potential vic252
tims on college campuses to push for change. There is a powerful institutional actor, DOE, validating the idea of their injury and supporting any attempts to come forward. Even women
who defend current sexual norms on college campuses because
they see them as better than the more restrictive sexual norms
that came before acknowledge that contemporary campuses fall
253
far short of an “egalitarian” ideal. Focusing on egalitarian250. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL
STRUCTION OF VICTIMS 99–103 (1989).

RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CON-

251. I don’t mean to sugar coat this problem. In my twenty years of teaching law school, for every one woman I have known who has been willing to report a professor or fellow student for inappropriate sexual behavior, there
have been at least three students who just don’t want to call attention to
themselves. Shockingly, to me, it is often their mothers who tell them not to
report anything officially.
252. See Libby Sander, Two Worlds, One Problem, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Mar. 24, 2014 (describing parallel problems with sexual assault in the military
and on college campuses and reporting that “attention is acute. In both worlds,
survivors—as many identify themselves—are driving the discussion. They are
optimistic that a combination of grass-roots advocacy, legislative action and
sustained media exposure will lead to meaningful progress”); see also PérezPeña & Taylor, supra note 65 (describing activity at Columbia University);
Robin Wilson, Ads Urge Students To Think Twice About Colleges with a “Rape
Problem,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 2014 (describing campaign by a
group called UltraViolet to target ads at people accepted at colleges who have
been lax in enforcing sexual assault prohibitions).
253. See ROSIN, supra note 56, at 18 (quoting a Yale graduate who
acknowledges that college is not an “egalitarian sexual wonderland . . . [b]ut
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ism, or the lack thereof, is probably the best strategy; but it is
no guarantee of success.
2. Is It Enough?
Changing the norm of male sexual entitlement on university campuses, even if successful, may seem like an incomplete
remedy. Only 42% of Americans between the ages of 18–24 go
254
to college. Still, “norm cascades” can follow from relatively
255
small but concentrated efforts to change norms. DOE’s efforts
256
have generated a great deal of press. At least one United
States Senator has launched her own investigation of sexual
257
assault on college campuses. Particularly if there is pent-up
frustration with the status quo—as there may be not just
among women, but among others who have come to view the
male behavior as wrong if not criminal—the status quo of what
258
is acceptable can change rapidly. On college campuses, if
people get used to seeing men held accountable, not necessarily
expelled, but punished for their behavior, such that they have
diminished freedom to pick their classes, or their dorm, or dicompared to when girls are punished for any sexual experience before marriage, it’s much better”).
254. See Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Oct. 17,
2015).
255. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997)
(“Norm cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shifts toward
new norms.”).
256. From January to July of 2014, the New York Times alone had 37 different stories about sexual assault on college campuses. Sexual Assault Stories
in the New York Times, N.Y. TIMES, query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/
(limit search date range to 1/1/2014 to 7/31/2014; then search “sexual assault”
and “college campus”). With the publication of the discredited Rolling Stone
story on an alleged rape at the University of Virginia, coverage of sexual assault on college campuses seemed to be everywhere. See generally Richard
Pérez-Peña, University Officials Blast Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2014, at
A15.
257. Sexual Violence on Campus: How Too Many Institutions of Higher Education Are Failing To Protect Students, SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL (July 9,
2014), http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SurveyReportwithApp
endix.pdf.
258.
People’s private judgments and desires diverge greatly from public
appearances. For this reason, current social states can be far more
fragile than is generally thought—as small shocks to publicly endorsed norms and roles decrease the cost of displaying deviant norms
and rapidly bring about large-scale changes in publicly displayed
judgments and desires.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 255.
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minished freedom to go to parties, then people will cease to see
259
this behavior as normal or inevitable. Once a significant, likely influential, segment of society sees a given behavior as unacceptable, their understanding of what is permissible can cascade downward.
The campaign against drunk driving may provide an important lesson in this regard. Most people who have studied the
issue believe that the significant decrease in the amount of
drunk driving that started in the 1990s was not the result of
increases in criminal enforcement rates or increased criminal
penalties, but came from an extra-legal campaign to alter the
norms that had invested people with a sense of entitlement to
260
drive after drinking. What changed was not the number of
laws against drunk driving or an increased likelihood of being
stopped, but the way people thought about drinking and driving. As Dan Kahan concluded, “[i]nformal enforcement of the
law, in the form of privately imposed stigma, was the gentle
nudge that shook loose the . . . norms that condoned drunk
261
driving.” DOE’s campaign represents a comparable campaign
to change the social norms that condone legally proscribed behavior. People and institutions outside the criminal law seek to
change norms so that, ultimately, the criminal law can be enforced.
Even if a proliferation of discrimination claims does not
make it any easier to secure criminal convictions, eroding the
norm of male entitlement to sex will reduce the amount of nonconsensual sex. As Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley
observe, “[t]he real power to gain compliance with society’s
rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the threat or reality of official criminal sanction, but in . . . [t]he networks of interpersonal relationships in which people find themselves, [and] the
social norms and prohibitions shared among those relation262
ships . . . .” Erosion of men’s sense of sexual entitlement may
not make enough people willing to criminally punish nonconsensual sex, but it should further decrease men’s likelihood
259. This may be particularly true for college students, for whom the freedom to choose one’s roommates and one’s parties is likely considered particularly important.
260. See Kahan, supra note 78, at 633–34 (discussing Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) and the moral campaign to decrease drunk driving).
261. Id.
262. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.
L. REV. 453, 457 (1997).

2015]

NOT A CRIME?

277

of engaging in increasingly non-normative behavior. The moniker “rape reform” suggested that what reformers cared about
was changing the definition of rape. They did. But surely they
were just as concerned with decreasing the amount of nonconsensual sex. It may be the best way to reduce nonconsensual sex is to treat it as something distinct from rape.
The danger, from a feminist perspective, is that treating
sexual misconduct as less serious than the common understanding of rape may trivialize men’s conduct and lead to far
too little moral condemnation of men’s sense of entitlement to
sex. But taking the opposite approach, criminalizing what had
been normative conduct in the name of protecting women’s
right to sexual autonomy has not worked well to date either.
And, for the reasons suggested above, it is not likely to be particularly effective at further eroding the norm of male entitlement to sex going forward. It may be time, and DOE has suggested that it is time, to try something new.
Focusing on discrimination instead of rape also helps
switch the focus away from victim injury and onto what is
wrong with perpetrator behavior. This may be useful because,
as Part IV suggested, the subjective, psychological and nonphysical nature of rape’s injury often generates a quagmire of
commentary that fails to produce consensus on how and why
women are hurt by rape. Even if we cannot adequately describe
the injury resulting from that non-consensual sex, the extent to
which college women must confront predatory male sexual be263
havior is striking. If DOE’s efforts can generate consensus
that the perpetrator behavior is problematic, even if not criminal, because it forces women to endure insults and hardships
that men rarely have to endure, then the questions regarding
how women are hurt recede into the background. It does not
matter exactly how they are hurt if there is a general understanding that they are treated unfairly and it is men who are
treating them that way.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the criminal law has been unable to prosecute as rape a tremendous amount of nonconsensual sex because it is too difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, because the law’s treatment of rape sends pro263 . See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 223.
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foundly inconsistent messages about who rapists are and how
bad rape is, and because women resist seeing themselves as
rape victims. DOE’s attempt to re-cast sexual assault as a discriminatory harm may allow universities to unearth and punish far more non-consensual sex than the criminal law has been
able to. This may then lead to more substantial erosion of the
social norm that validates male entitlement to sex because people will see men punished for assuming that their entitlement
to sex overrides a woman’s quiet desire not to go forward. If
that norm is more successfully eroded, criminal prosecution
may then become easier as male entitlement to sex begins to
seem less legitimate.
There is some convergence, then, between what I’ve suggested here and Professor Rubenfeld’s insistence that the force
requirement be part of the definition of rape. At least in the
short term, perhaps the criminal law of rape should focus only
or mainly on those instances in which force or threat of force is
apparent. The criminal law should do this not because the injury that women suffer in rape is so much worse or qualitatively
different when force is involved, but because proving force is all
the criminal law can do, and it is all many women seem willing
to let the criminal law try to do. Professor Rubenfeld argues
that the feminist attempt to make force irrelevant was theoretically unsound and normatively problematic. This Article counters that it is the theory and normative commitments that are
irrelevant. Assuming basic allegiance to criminal due process,
including criminal standards of proof and rights to impeachment and confrontation, the criminal law simply cannot do
what feminists asked it to do. The law of sex discrimination,
particularly applied in an educational setting, quite possibly
could.

